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The use of authorial marks in relation to the sale of creative works, like the 
use of business trademarks in relation to the sale of goods and services, 
creates social benefits that deserve legal protection.  Authorial attribution acts 
as an incentive to authorial production, provides valuable information to 
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consumers, and provides additional social benefits that go beyond issues of 
market efficiency.  However, the use of authorial marks, like the use of 
trademarks, can create social harms.  Just as counterfeiters place illegitimate 
trademarks on goods, exploiters of entertainment markets may be tempted to 
misattribute authorship.  In the United States, such deceptive practices were 
traditionally subject to the remedial mechanisms of trademark and unfair 
competition laws.  However, in a 2003 decision, Dastar Corporation v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, the United States Supreme Court 
held that federal trademark law does not address the misattribution of 
authorship.  The Dastar decision stated that trademark protections were 
designed to protect the creators of tangible products sold in the marketplace. 
The Court stated that trademark law was not designed to protect the interests 
of those who originate creative ideas or communications. 
This article explores society’s interests in ascertaining the authorship of 
creative works and explains how those interests both resemble and diverge 
from standard trademark interests.  It concludes that as authorship marks are 
sufficiently analogous to trademarks, the Dastar approach is misguided.  
Consumers can and should be protected from misattributions of authorship 
where such misattributions can easily be remedied by law and where the 
failure to provide such remedies is likely to lead to significant consumer 
harms. 
INTRODUCTION 
    A good name is better than precious ointment. 1  
 
The earliest known paintings in existence, the wall paintings in the cave of 
Chauvet, are marked with what seem to be the handprint signatures of the 
artists who created them over 30,000 years ago.2  The intended meaning of 
these handprints is not clear, but they function to fuse an aspect of the artist’s 
physical identity with the surface of the medium.  In essence, they are 
signatures.  Literary signature, which fuses a mark of authorial identity with a 
text, also has ancient roots.  The earliest literary author to sign her name to a 
work was the ancient Mesopotamian high priestess Enheduanna, who wrote 
1 Ecclesiastes 7:1 (King James).  See also Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 
589 F.2d 1225, 1227 (3d Cir. 1978) (“In his classic ‘Essay on Walking,’ Thoreau expressed 
the notion that there is nothing in a name.  This view has been vigorously rejected by both 
parties to this [trademark] litigation, not to mention almost all of mankind to whom a name 
is an important means of identification.”) (citing Ecclesiastes). 
2 Corey Field, Copyright, Technology, and Time: Perspectives on “Interactive” as a 
Term of Art in Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 49, 52 (2003).  The 
handprints were created by blowing pigment over the hand held against the rock surface, 
creating a “negative” print of the hand.  Field leads his article with a photograph of the 
handprints, but he frames the handprints as a proto-copyright assertion of ownership, not 
signature.  Id. 
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poems circa 2300 B.C.3  Centuries later, a version of the Sumerian Epic of 
Gilgamesh was attributed to the scribe Sin-Leqi-Unninni.4  The practice of 
artistic signature persists today.  It is neither a recent nor an exclusively 
Western phenomenon.5  Even where works are not signed by artists, one might 
argue that all artistic works are intimately bound up with the artist’s identity, 
making the work itself a form of personal signature.6  Works of artistic 
production generally bear traces that may betray the true identity of the 
creator.7  In various small details, authors leave unconscious “fingerprints” on 
their works that, like handwriting, reveal their personal involvement with the 
creation.8  Just as an actor’s facial expressions, style of walking, or manner of 
speech may be unconsidered yet potentially expressive, so an artist’s efforts at 
self-expression are at least partially governed by unconscious mannerisms.9  
And obviously, there are some conscious mannerisms that appear in authorial 
styles – certain skills, themes, interests, and ideologies are reliably associated 
with particular authors.  It should be no surprise that computer-aided 
algorithmic analysis of handwriting, paint-strokes, and word usage can be used 
3 ENHEDUANNA, INANNA, LADY OF LARGEST HEART: POEMS OF THE SUMERIAN HIGH 
PRIESTESS ENHEDUANNA (Betty De Shong Meador ed. & trans., 2001). 
4 SIN-LEQI-UNNINNI, GILGAMESH: TRANSLATED FROM THE SIN-LEQI-UNNINNI VERSION 
(John Gardner et al., trans. 1985).  Sin-Leqi-Unninni’s attributed version was merely a re-
telling of the much older Gilgamesh story – it would be called a derivative work in the 
parlance of copyright law. 
5 Cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the 
Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 985 (2002) (“The 
right of attribution recognizes a fundamental truth about human nature.”). 
6  See Paul Edward Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth, 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR, Jan. 1994, at 3, 21 (“Romantic critics 
[believed that] by virtue of the creative act . . . authors would necessarily leave the marks of 
their unique personalities on their works.”). 
7 This is not to say that creating such traces is always a goal of artistic production.  For 
instance, those who engage in artistic forgery seek essentially to replicate the known identity 
traces of another.  See GIORGIO VASARI, THE LIVES OF THE ARTISTS 418, 423-24 (Julia 
Conaway Bondanella & Peter Bondanella trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1549) 
(recounting how Michelangelo forged old drawings so that he could return the forged copies 
and retain the originals, and reporting the infamous sale of a forged ancient Cupid for a 
seventy ducat premium).  Also, it is impossible to speak categorically about “artists,” some 
of whom make it a point to defy categorical claims about artistry.  For instance, Michel 
DuChamp and Jeff Koons have simply found objects and duplicated or recontextualized 
them.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992) (“In his ‘production 
notes’ Koons stressed that he wanted ‘Puppies’ copied faithfully in the sculpture.  For 
example, he told his artisans the ‘work must be just like photo – features of photo must be 
captured;’ later, ‘puppies need detail in fur. Details – Just Like Photo!’”). 
8 Noah Schactman, Software Detects the True Artist, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 22, 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,65794,00.html (explaining how the 
characteristics of an artist’s brush strokes can identify the artist). 
9 See id. 
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to explore the veracity of claims of authorship.10  Because society cares about 
ascertaining authorship, experts who police the veracity of claimed authorship 
attributions sometimes employ such techniques.11
But do the laws of intellectual property protect indicia of an author’s 
identity?  In a recent decision, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., the United States Supreme Court essentially answered “no.”12  The 
Court in Dastar stated that trademark law does not protect against 
misattributions of authorship because such protections would bring trademark 
law into conflict with copyright law.13  Copyright law is generally understood 
as the regulatory framework that speaks to artistic creation.  Copyright law, 
however, says very little about the attribution of authorship.14  Thus, shorn 
from trademark law by Dastar and ignored by copyright, markings of 
authorship are generally not protected by the two primarily federal laws of 
intellectual property that would conceivably regulate such marks.  This does 
not mean that authorial markings are entirely beyond legal regulation.  For 
instance, authors may use copyright as a lever to demand attributions of 
authorship.15  To some extent, authors may also seek protections against the 
misuse of their names pursuant to rights of publicity (in states where such 
protections exist).  Consumers deceived by authorial misrepresentations may 
still make claims of misrepresentation and fraud when they are harmed by false 
designations of authorship.16  But these options create only a spotty, collateral 
patchwork of protection.  In the two places one might reasonably expect to see 
markings of authorship regulated – the federal intellectual property laws of 
trademark and copyright – the law is essentially silent. 
This article argues that Congress should amend the Lanham Act to reject the 
Dastar decision and once again apply trademark law to indications of 
authorship.17  The article proceeds as follows: Part I argues that social benefits 
10 Id. (describing how invisible pen and brush strokes in artistic works can be detected by 
computer imaging and attributed to specific artists through algorithmic analyses). 
11 Id. (chronicling a Dartmouth College team’s effort to verify the authenticity of a 
painting).  Admittedly, in the case of an artist like Koons, who essentially recontextualizes 
works and sometimes employs others to do this, such techniques would likely prove 
ineffective.  See supra note 7. 
12 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003) (explaining that there is no legal recourse for complaints of 
plagiarism). 
13 Id. at 33. 
14 See infra Part II.C. 
15 See infra Part II.C.2. 
16 See infra Part II.D. 
17 Cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and 
Trademark Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 286-306 (2004) (suggesting that the Dastar decision 
should be remedied by legislative action with regard to moral rights); Laura A. Heymann, 
The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2005) (observing that trademark designations and authorial 
attributions share common characteristics and arguing, from the standpoint of First 
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from practices of accurate authorial attribution largely track the social benefits 
provided by source attributions under trademark law.  (By contrast, some 
recent commentary on the Dastar case has focused primarily on how authors 
benefit from attribution, discussing the “moral rights” of creators to claim 
rights of attribution.18)  Part II discusses Dastar and explains how theories of 
trademark and copyright relate to interests in authorial attribution.  Part III 
differentiates social concerns over practices of plagiarism and ghostwriting 
from issues raised by collaborative authorship.  Part III proposes that 
trademark law should regulate indicia of authorship, but that the scope of 
authorial attribution protections under trademark law should be crafted as a 
conservative, non-traditional form of trademark protection. 
I. AUTHORIAL ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIETY 
   
   In the room the women come and go 
   Talking of Michelangelo19
 
Why should trademark law speak at all to the issue of authorial attribution?  
In answer to this question, I would like to put aside one argument and advance 
three others. I would like to eschew the claim that trademark law should 
protect against authorial misattribution because society owes such protection to 
authors as an ethical, legal, or political imperative.  In other words, I am not 
advocating here for a stripe of authorial “moral rights” protections in response 
to the Dastar decision.20  This article does not oppose such arguments.21  
Amendment law and literary theory, that the law must recognize “the essential 
pseudonymity of all statements of authorship”). 
18 See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 265 (“Reputation is critical to a person who follows a 
vocation dependent on commissions from a variety of clients.  Success breeds success, but 
only if the first success is known to potential clients.”); David Nimmer, The Moral 
Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Passing 
Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 77 (2004) (“In sum, there is in the United States, and there 
should continue to be, a moral right against passing off.  As a general matter, by contrast, 
the reverse should be limited to specialized settings, such as academe, where attribution lies 
at the core of the raison d’etre for the creation of works.”); Justin Hughes, American Moral 
Rights and the Dastar Decision 3 (Cardozo Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 96, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=618783 (understanding Dastar in the context of moral 
rights and the Berne Convention). 
19 T.S. ELIOT, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, reprinted in T.S. ELIOT, THE 
COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909-1950 3, 4 (1952). 
20 The United States is required, by treaty, to protect such rights.  See John T. Cross, 
Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse Passing Off in 
Trademark Law, 72 WASH. L. REV. 709, 761-62 (1997) (discussing and critiquing U.S. 
efforts to comply with the requirements of the Berne Convention); Ginsburg, supra note 17, 
at 265 (“[T]he Berne Convention . . . requires that Member States protect other Members’ 
authors’ ‘right to claim authorship.’”); Kwall, supra note 5, at 1003 (discussing attempts to 
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However, framing the authorial attribution question along these lines runs the 
risk of casting attribution as a struggle between the rights and interests of 
artists and the rights and interests of state and society.  Attribution rights under 
such an analysis become a zero-sum game in which authors and artists must 
find some foothold (ethical, legal, or rhetorical) by which to obtain 
entitlements from society that are currently lacking.  However, if we focus on 
the manner in which authorial attribution practices benefit society, we can 
move beyond the standard tug-of-war. 
Along those lines, I would like to make three brief observations with regard 
to how the application of trademark to authorial attribution might benefit 
society.  The first two benefits align fairly well with the benefits commonly 
associated with trademarks: facilitating the production of quality products and 
reducing consumer search costs.22  A third argument is that accurate authorial 
attribution benefits society because it is a type of information that has a special 
social value. 
A. Attribution as Incentive 
With regard to the first argument, it is clear that authorial attribution can 
function much like a trademark interest.  If artists seek riches, they must 
compete for patrons, prizes, and the favor of the public.  In order to win in this 
competition, artists must attempt to ensure that their works are of high quality, 
and that prospective consumers will associate their new works with their 
established reputations.  If artists can ensure attribution of their works, artists 
producing better quality will gain public goodwill and reap the benefits of their 
investments in producing works of higher quality.23  This recognition and 
goodwill can lead to greater opportunities for employment and contractual 
leverage.  Authorial attribution is thus a mechanism for ensuring that greater 
profits flow to those producing superior products. 
But the incentive role of attribution is not merely financial, as generally 
secure attribution rights using the Lanham Act). 
21 Indeed, I generally agree with Jane Ginsburg, Roberta Kwall, and others who suggest 
that copyright law needs to be more attuned to protecting the interests of authors, not simply 
those who are currently benefiting from copyright entitlements.  See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, 
The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1092 
(2003) (criticizing the work for hire paradigm that secures rights on a basis other than 
authorship). 
22 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-73 (1987) (applying a comprehensive economic 
model to many of the doctrines of trademark law in an attempt to understand its costs and 
benefits); see also Barton Beebe, Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
621, 623-24 (2004) (identifying the Chicago School analysis as the dominant theory of 
trademark protection). 
23 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on 
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 787 (2004) (“Sellers benefit because they can invest in 
goodwill with the knowledge that others will not appropriate it.”). 
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posited in the case of trademark protections.24  In the case of authorship, the 
benefits reaped by artists from attribution are social and psychological as 
well.25  In the past, these social and psychological benefits may have even been 
the primary reward provided in return for artistic production – simply because 
no other significant reward existed.  A desire for the immortality of fame might 
have played some part in the creative efforts made by Enheduanna, Sin-Leqi-
Unninni, and Homer.  In the era of mass media and diffused corporate control 
of trademarks, we do not often think of attribution as providing this kind of 
benefit as an incentive to greater production.  The legal academy generally 
continues to regard copyright law’s financial incentives as the primary engine 
driving creative production, even though there are many reasons to be 
suspicious of this claim.26  When copyright law is viewed against the panorama 
of artistic creativity throughout human history, it is revealed to be a very recent 
legal ordering birthed by technological revolution, fueled in its expansion by 
particular business models, and perhaps best explained as a means of providing 
incentives to distribute works through technologies of reproduction.27  Indeed, 
some have argued that copyright is primarily attuned to protecting the interests 
of publishers, not the interests of authors as artists.28
Socially valuable artistic production obviously predated copyright’s birth in 
the seventeenth century.  Copyright was instituted, in a rather limited form, 
more than a century after Michelangelo’s death.29  This is not to say that the 
24 Cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 23, at 799 n.84 (noting that “[n]oneconomic 
justifications for trademark law are rare”). 
25 The strong allure of fame to artists does not require a lengthy footnote.  Suffice it to 
say that a popular movie, song, and television series about a school for young performing 
artists was not entitled Profit.  See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 1 n.1 
(1997) (citing the television series Fame and the associated movie and song).  Many 
scholars have argued that the pursuit of fame motivates artistic creativity.  See Cross, supra 
note 20, at 764-66 (“[M]any artists are unique in that they want recognition for recognition’s 
sake . . . .  [F]ame itself provides part, or maybe even all, of the motivation for creative 
activity.”); Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some 
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 174 (2002). 
26 Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka,  Amateur-to-Amateur,  46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
951, 991-92 (2005) (observing that copyright, ironically, is largely irrelevant to the 
production of legal scholarship). 
27 Id. at 979-985 (discussing the application of copyright law to various copying 
technologies); F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS 
COMP. & TECH. L.J. 293, 293-97 (2001) (describing modes of distribution and explaining 
changes resulting from digital technology). 
28 See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 61 (2002). 
29 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).  Indeed, copyright 
was extended to protect works of visual art only a little more than a century ago.  EDWARD 
  
1178 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1171 
 
 
quest for fame and attribution was the only thing that drove Michelangelo’s 
efforts – the motivations for his work were complex.30  As his artistic genius 
and reputation grew, his personal profits grew in equal measure.31  Yet it is 
interesting to note how Michelangelo’s desire for a perfect reputation, at 
various points in his life, eclipsed his desire to increase his wealth.32  Giorgio 
Vasari, a contemporary of Michelangelo, explained how Michelangelo 
destroyed valuable works that he believed to be of inferior quality: 
[H]e often abandoned his works, or rather ruined many of them . . . just 
before his death he burned a large number of his own drawings, sketches, 
and cartoons to prevent anyone from seeing the labours he endured or the 
ways he tested his genius, for fear that he might seem less than 
perfect . . . .33
Michelangelo could certainly have sold off these inferior drawings and 
sketches in order to benefit himself or his friends.  Instead, where his 
reputational interests and financial interests appeared to diverge, he protected 
his reputation.34  Some might lament the loss of those destroyed drawings, and 
see Michelangelo’s pursuit of a perfect reputation as excessive.  But the 
paradox is that the reputation dynamic that drove Michelangelo to destroy his 
work was also the dynamic that drove him to strive for perfection and to create 
his most celebrated works.  Michelangelo decided that only a certain quality of 
artistic work would further his reputational interests, and it was this type of 
work that he struggled to produce.35  If reputation and attribution played a part 
in driving Michelangelo to create his celebrated works, society ultimately 
benefited from accurate authorial attribution practices.36
SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 11-15 (2000); Paul Edward Geller, 
Copyright History and the Future: What’s Culture Got to Do With It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 215 (2000) (describing the origins of English copyright law in fifteenth-
century monopolies on printing). 
30  GEORGE BULL, MICHELANGELO: LIFE, LETTERS, AND POETRY 28-73 (George Bull & 
Peter Porter eds. & trans., 1987) (translating and updating Ascanio Condivi’s account). 
31 Id. 
32 Biographical accounts suggest that while Michelangelo was generally reclusive and 
sometimes a bit miserly, he was very concerned with his artistic reputation.  VASARI, supra 
note 7.  See also BULL, supra note 30, at 61-62 (translating Ascanio Condivi); DIANE 
STANLEY, MICHELANGELO 24, 39 (2000) (detailing how Michelangelo was a perfectionist in 
his work, but shunned riches).  It is interesting to note that Michelangelo did not fix his 
name to his works, and signed only the Pieta statue.  However, he signed that work not on 
the base, as was customary, but on the prominent ribbon that crosses the Virgin’s chest at 
eye level.  LAURIE ADAMS, ITALIAN RENAISSANCE ART 316 (2001). 
33 VASARI, supra note 7, at 472. 
34 Id. (describing how Michelangelo destroyed many of his own works). 
35 Id. 
36 See supra note 32. 
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B. Attribution as Consumer Protection 
A second argument for regulation of authorial attribution is also closely 
related to the standard justifications for trademark regulation.  Authorial 
attribution furthers the interests of consumers by reducing the costs of 
searching for creative content.  As Mark Rose has noted, a mark of authorship 
functions much like a trademark – it signals a certain predictable quality and 
type of associated work.37
In the fiction sections of libraries and bookstores, books are generally 
arranged alphabetically by the last names of their respective authors.  The 
names of these authors also appear on the covers and spines of the works, 
sometimes encompassing the entire top half of a book’s cover.38  Indicia of 
authorship must be conveying some form of valuable information to 
consumers.  If they were not, the existence of these bold statements of 
authorship would be mysterious.  For instance, other products for sale, 
including those protected by other species of intellectual property laws, are not 
generally emblazoned with the names of their creative originators and 
inventors.  Arthur Fry, the creative inventor of Post-it® notes, certainly 
wouldn’t mind being credited with his invention.39  He surely would not object 
if office supplies were sorted by his last name (i.e., under “F” for Fry).  
Inventors like Fry likely share the same pride in their inventions that authors 
possess in the novels they write.  But to emblazon inventor names on items for 
sale would probably strike us as absurd in the case of office products.  Most of 
us just don’t care who came up with the idea for the Post-it® note – the identity 
of the creator is severable from the product. 
Yet works of creative authorship are different.  In the case of creative works, 
indicia of authorship can provide special value to consumers.  From a 
consumer standpoint, particular authors are believed to be associated with 
works possessing certain intrinsic qualities.40  For example, consumers are 
likely to believe that all novels by the authors Tom Clancy and V.C. Andrews 
possess certain distinctive qualities.  Like trademarks, these authorial 
attributions enable consumers who are searching for particular types and 
37 MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 1 (1993) (commenting that an author is “a kind 
of brand name, a recognizable sign that the cultural commodity will be of a certain kind and 
quality”). 
38 See, e.g., MICHAEL CRICHTON, CONGO (Avon Books 2003) (evidencing the importance 
of an author’s name by displaying it as large as the title on the cover of a book). 
39 Arthur Fry and a colleague were responsible for the invention of 3M’s Post-it® Notes.  
See U.S. Patent No. 5,194, 299 (filed Dec. 31, 1986); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, 
Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 331-32 (1992). 
40 See ROSE, supra note 37; Cross, supra note 20, at 762 (“[T]he artist’s name provides 
some indication of the quality of the work.”); Diana Elzey Pinover, The Rights of Authors, 
Artists and Performers Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 38, 47 
(1993) (acknowledging the converse proposition that an author’s early work, or poorer 
quality work, may detract from the value of her name as a mark). 
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qualities of products to find those products that they consider more 
appealing.41  While authors’ names are not trademarks per se and not all 
consumers value authorial indicia in all instances, author names can act very 
much like trademarks by providing useful information to consumers selecting 
among competing products.42
C. Attribution as Value 
While the prior two sections sought to justify the social value of authorial 
attribution by appealing to incentive effects or utility in reducing consumer 
search costs, there is another social value provided by attribution.  Society has 
expressed an entirely independent, somewhat sui generis interest in 
demarcating and ascertaining authorship, unrelated to any instrumental and 
utilitarian effects that authorial attribution may have on markets and 
production.43  In other words, a correct authorial attribution is a thing of value 
in itself. 
To take the example of Michelangelo again, we can assume that the price of 
a drawing by Michelangelo will be higher than the price of a work by other 
artists who were his contemporaries.  Are Michelangelo’s drawings of a better 
quality?  The answer is generally yes, but the interesting point to see here is 
that a hypothetical drawing attributed to Michelangelo would be valued more 
highly than a hypothetical work by one of his contemporaries even if the two 
hypothetical works were identical.44  A lousy Michelangelo drawing is a 
valuable chattel – more valuable than the same lousy drawing that isn’t 
attributed to Michelangelo.  Michelangelo’s attribution, therefore, does not 
simply convey information about the value of the work to which the attribution 
is attached.  The attribution, to some extent, creates the value. 45
One might argue that the value of the object in this case stems simply from 
the value of celebrity aura associated with a tangible artifact.46  Michelangelo’s 
41 Cross, supra note 20, at 753-54 (positing that discovering the source of a product is a 
quick way for a consumer to evaluate the product). 
42 See infra Part II.A and Part III. 
43 See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
44 Even Michelangelo’s attempted forgeries, if recognized as such, would likely 
command a higher value today than they would were they authentic.  See supra note 7. 
45 This tracks roughly with another, much less venerable and less accepted vein in 
trademark theory: the anti-dilution theories of trademark protection, codified in federal law 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).  The general notion of these theories is that the law should 
protect a trademark signifier’s value in itself, independent of its associative value which 
stems from linking the mark with a particular associated quality of underlying goods or 
services.  See Beebe, supra note 22, at 684-87 (reviewing the anti-dilution theories as the 
basis for trademark protection); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927), reprinted in 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334, 336-38 
(1970) (arguing that a trademark has value apart from the signification of a source). 
46 See WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
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celebrity could create similar value in paintbrushes and chisels that he 
employed to create his works.  Artifacts that are associated with any figure of 
fame (say, Benjamin Franklin’s eyeglasses or a dress worn by Marilyn 
Monroe47) often have a fetishistic or historical value to consumers that seems 
strangely disproportionate to any detached measure of the object’s utility.48  
But the value created by authorship is not limited to tangible fetishes – a 
person who framed a supposed Michelangelo print might discount the value of 
the reproduction if the original was subsequently determined to be a forgery.  
The point here is that authorship matters to the public because it places a work 
in a particular social context.  Indeed, even when objects are not for sale and 
artists and authors are long dead, society will often police issues of authorial 
attribution for their own sake.  Was De Doctrina Christiana the work of 
Milton?  Was Titus Andronicus the work of Shakespeare?  We might ask why 
these questions even matter – but we can’t deny that they do matter to many 
people and that many intelligent people engage in vigorous debates over these 
exact questions.  In the case of Shakespeare, scholarly wrangling over 
authorship rises to the level of a recognized field of academic research.49  This 
type of social interest in attribution admittedly isn’t the rule for most artists and 
authors, but neither is it all that rare.  The scholar Kathryn Lindskoog, for 
instance, devoted much of her life to exposing what she believed to be 
misattribution marring the reputation of C.S. Lewis.50  The general point here 
(1937), in ILLUMINATIONS 219, 223 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968) (1955) 
(discussing how mechanical reproduction transformed the nature of artistic objects by 
removing the aura of originality). 
47 See, e.g., Brendan Walsh, Collecting Marilyn: Blonde Bombshell Inspires Local Man’s 
$10,000 Search, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES (Tex.), Sept. 18, 2001, available at 
http://www.caller2.com/2001/september/18/today/fea-livi/11808.html (“At Christie’s 
auction house in 1999, a two-day auction of Monroe’s personal belongings netted more than 
$13.4 million.  The most expensive item, the dress Monroe wore when she sang ‘Happy 
Birthday’ to President Kennedy in 1962, went for $1.26 million.”). 
48 Cf. Margeret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) 
(commenting how the primary value of certain objects may derive from notions of self and 
personhood). 
49 James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. 
UNIV. L. REV. 625, 627 (1988) (noting that “[t]here are some fifty-six claimants to 
Shakespeare’s throne – some of whom are supposed to have worked alone, while others are 
supposed to have collaborated in the most unlikely assemblies”); see also The Shakespeare 
Fellowship, http://www.shakespearefellowship.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2005) 
(collecting internet resources on the issue of Shakespearean authorship).  Even law reviews 
have recently joined the fray.  See Thomas Regnier, Comment, Could Shakespeare Think 
Like a Lawyer?  How Inheritance Law Issues in Hamlet May Shed Light on the Authorship 
Question, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 377 (2002) (examining the use of legal terms in 
Shakespeare’s works to ascertain the correct identity of the author). 
50 Lindskoog had alleged that the Lewis estate has tampered with the canon, most 
notably in the case of the posthumously published Lewis novel, The Dark Tower (1983), a 
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is that accurate authorial attribution can be relevant to people other than the 
authors of works.  It can be relevant to society for reasons that cannot be 
captured in terms of market efficiencies. 
These broader social interests in ascertaining and denoting authorship 
operate independently of the author, persist after the death of the author, and at 
times fly in the face of the “moral rights” approach that focuses on protecting 
the personal interests of the artist.51  George Maciunas is a good example.52  
Maciunas was a twentieth-century modern artist who was ideologically 
opposed to what he saw as the tradition of the self-absorbed, privileged, 
bourgeoisie artist separated from the working class.53  He attempted to destroy 
this division by forming a movement within which individual artistic 
attributions (and copyright) would be forbidden.  He demanded that all artists 
in his revolutionary enterprise would produce under the name FLUXUS.54 
Commentators today, however, routinely identify George Maciunas as the 
artistic originator of the FLUXUS group, and point to the respective 
involvements of John Cage, Yoko Ono, June Paik, Al Hansen, and others.55  
The success of the FLUXUS movement in attracting attention was the cause of 
its failure to achieve its goals.56
As Giorgio Vasari’s famous tome on the lives of his contemporaries 
indicates,57 society is interested not only in the works of authors and artists, but 
also in exploring the personalities and lives of those who have created socially 
prominent works.  The reader’s impulse to learn about the author can and does 
operate against the interests of the author in some cases.  Maciunas is one 
very strange work of science fiction.  KATHRYN ANN LINDSKOOG, SLEUTHING C. S. LEWIS: 
MORE LIGHT IN THE SHADOWLANDS (2001); see also Scott McLemee, Holy War in the 
Shadowlands, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 20, 2001, at A12 (describing Lindskoog’s 
allegations of tampering by Lewis’s estate). 
51 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 
9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (protecting the 
moral rights of artists by mandating rights of attribution and integrity). 
52 ERIKA DOSS, TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN ART 148 (2002) (discussing the work of 
George Maciunas). 
53 Id. 
54 As Maciunas explained in a letter to a friend in 1964, “Eventually we would destroy 
the authorship of pieces and make them totally anonymous – thus eliminating artist’s ‘ego.’  
Author would be FLUXUS.”  THEORIES AND DOCUMENTS OF CONTEMPORARY ART: A 
SOURCEBOOK OF ARTISTS’ WRITINGS 725-28 (Peter Selz & Kristine Stiles eds., 1996) (letter 
from Maciunas to Thomas Schmit circa 1964).  
55 DOSS, supra note 52, at 148 (observing how Maciunas coined “Fluxus”); THOMAS 
HOVING, ART FOR DUMMIES 180 (1999) (noting “the Fluxus events of George Maciunas”).   
56 See HOVING, supra note 55, at 180 (associating Fluxus with Maciunas despite 
Maciunas’s desire for anonymity in his art).   
57 VASARI, supra note 7 (remarking on the personal lives of contemporary artists with 
whom Vasari was familiar). 
  
2005] TRADEMARK FUNCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 1183 
 
 
prominent example, and J.D. Salinger presents another.58  Readers have always 
been interested in exploring the personality of the artist as a means to 
appreciate and further explore the work.59  The practice of exploring and 
appreciating literature by exploring the identity of the author was, prior to the 
last century, an acceptable academic practice.  Only with the ascendancy of 
New Criticism was authorial hagiography denigrated.60  New Criticism, 
partaking in the broader formalistic rigor of modernism, isolated the text from 
the author.  The inevitable result of this effort was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
collapse of the concept of any fixed meaning in texts and the publication of an 
essay (authored by Roland Barthes) where the author was proclaimed dead.61  
Michel Foucault suggested that authorship acted as an interpretive construct 
primarily serving to limit the freedom of potential meanings in a text.62  Yet 
throughout all this revolution and interpretive upheaval, the public still was 
buying People Magazine and reading about the personal lives of John 
Grisham, Steven King, and Tom Clancy.  In some respects, new media made 
58 Of course, one might question the true motives of Maciunas and Salinger.  See, e.g., 
Alex Beam, J.D. Salinger, Failed Recluse, SLATE, June 29, 1999, 
http://slate.msn.com/id/31263/ (“If Salinger really wants to be left alone, he is going about it 
in a very strange way.  He doesn’t live in a gated community.  He summons perfect 
strangers into his hideaway.  He sues people, and then phones the media to spread the 
story.”). 
59 See Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of 
the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 725, 734-35 (1993) (explaining the historical importance 
to literary criticism of studying the life and personality of the author). 
60 See id. at 734-35 (“New Criticism . . . developed as a reaction to the Romantic notion 
of genius and the academic pre-eminence of historical study.  In New Critical theory, ‘work’ 
replaced ‘author’ as the central unifying force in literary criticism.  This version of 
modernist thought conceived of the creative work as autonomous and ahistorical.”).  While 
New Criticism is clearly an ideology of interpretation that might be disputed, romantic 
authorship (which might be aligned with a more central notion of authorship) has probably 
had a more pronounced effect on our system of intellectual property.  It is equally 
susceptible to critique.  See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY x-xi (1996); Boyle, supra note 49 
(exploring the importance of determining the author of a work in order to interpret the 
meaning of his or her writing); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (commenting on how the notion of 
authorship has been used in the development of intellectual property law); David Lange, At 
Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-
Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 136 (1992) (describing how new 
technologies are eroding intellectual property and the constraints on authorship). 
61 ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT (Stephen Heath, 
trans., 1978) (proclaiming that the reader, not the writer, should be at the center of 
criticism). 
62 See Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101, 107 (Paul 
Rabinow ed., 1984) (asserting that the notion of “author” performs a classification and 
interpretative function for works, beyond a mere identification role). 
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the identity of the artist an even greater public concern.  For instance, in the 
realm of music, MTV made the combination of image, celebrity, and 
marketing triumph over the pure appreciation of sound.  From a societal 
perspective, the author never died – and she was never even seriously ill.  
Well-known post-authorship figures such as Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Derrida found their personalities and life histories deeply intertwined with 
prevalent social interpretations of their publications.63  When society cares 
about a creative work, it cares about the work’s author.  Making the connection 
between personal identity and creative work has always been a natural move. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence that society still cares very much about 
authorial attribution is our reactions to plagiarism.  While credit-claiming for 
the words of others is a fairly common practice,64 it is one that is generally 
censured by society.  Social norms that condemn plagiarism are, essentially, 
social norms that strongly condemn authorial misattribution.65  The 
conventional legal understanding of the term “plagiarism” is that it is not a 
violation of any law, but a violation of the norm of accurate authorial 
attribution.66  Even in this postmodern era, anti-plagiarism norms remain quite 
63 See Wikipedia: Michel Foucault, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2005); Wikipedia: Jacques Derrida, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Derrida (last visited Aug. 7, 2005). 
64 See Roger Billings, Plagiarism in Academia and Beyond: What Is the Role of the 
Courts?, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 391, 396 (2004) (“Almost everyone plagiarizes.  Nearly every 
time a joke is told it is borrowed without attribution.  Abraham Lincoln routinely retold 
jokes he borrowed from magazines.  Ministers and pastors borrow sermons from each other 
without attribution; easily available collections of sermons all but invite plagiarism.”); Lisa 
G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 
42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 468 (2001) (“It is as if admission to the bar is like walking through a 
looking-glass.  On one side, plagiarism is considered to be the most egregious variety of 
dishonesty.  On the other side, the use of the words and ideas of others without attribution is 
not regarded as raising any ethical concern.”). 
65 Anonymous, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Web: A Cautionary Tale of 
Plagiarism, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 525, 525 (2001) (“Like most of us who manage to get 
something we’ve written published, I am always gratified if my work is cited or found 
useful enough to be quoted by others.  When confronted with this blatant theft of my work, 
however, I was shocked and genuinely hurt.”). 
66 Randall P. Bezanson, Speaking Through Others’ Voices: Authorship, Originality, and 
Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1075 (2003) (“Plagiarism consists of the 
conscious taking of another’s specific words and ideas as one’s own without any 
attribution.”); Billings, supra note 64, at 392 (“Plagiarism is the borrowing of someone 
else’s work without attribution.”); Robert D. Bills, Plagiarism in Law School: Close 
Resemblance of the Worst Kind?, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 103, 108 (1990) (“Borrowing 
from another’s work with attribution does not constitute an act of plagiary because there is 
no pretense of originality.”); Terri LeClercq, Failure to Teach: Due Process and Law 
School Plagiarism, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 236, 245 (1999) (“[F]ailure to attribute is key to 
plagiarism”); Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, 
Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 475 (2001) (“To claim authorship of 
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strong.67  When a public figure is charged with plagiarism, the public concern 
is not primarily about protecting the possessory interests of the “owner” of the 
stolen words. Instead, society sees itself as the victim of duplicity and is 
interested in passing judgment on the character of the plagiarist.  Recent 
scandals relating to the authorship practices of Stephen Ambrose, Doris Kearns 
Goodwin, Laurence Tribe, and Charles Ogletree all demonstrate that the media 
is confident that the public wants to hear news about high-profile plagiarism.68  
The morality play is clearly the attraction here – in most of these cases, the 
average citizen is unlikely to have ever read the materials that were claimed to 
have been plagiarized. 
II. LEGAL REGULATION OF AUTHORIAL ATTRIBUTION 
Given social interests in attribution, we might expect the law of the United 
States to play some regulatory role in the realm of authorial attribution.  At the 
turn of the last century, the law did play this role.69  Social protections against 
work that was in fact authored by another is plagiarism.”); Laurie Steans, Copy Wrong: 
Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 41 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 58 (1998) 
(“Plagiarism is not necessarily copyright infringement, nor is copyright infringement 
necessarily plagiarism.”). 
67 The gulf between literary theory and contemporary social intuitions with regard to 
misattributive practices is rather pronounced – New Critical approaches to textual 
interpretation don’t seem to square well with modern cultural beliefs about inchoate rights 
to appropriate credit.  Compare, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) (arguing 
that prohibitions against plagiarism are problematic in light of contemporary literary 
theories), and K.K. RUTHVEN, FAKING LITERATURE i (2001) (arguing that “the production of 
a literary forgery is an act that reveals the spurious nature of literature itself”), with Lisa 
Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 42 
S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 492 (2001) (“This examination of the question of authorship suggests 
that there is no justification for a professor to take the work of a research assistant and 
publish it as his own.”), and THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS: THE CLASSIC BOOK ON 
PLAGIARISM 243 (Harcourt, Inc. 1st ed. 2001) (“[A]cademics remain curiously willing to 
vaporize the whole phenomenon of plagiarism in a cloud of French theory.”). 
68 Joseph Bottum, Laurence Tribe and the problem of borrowed scholarship, THE 
WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 4, 2004, available at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/674eijco.asp (calling 
a book by Tribe on constitutional law “uncomfortably reliant” on another scholar’s work); 
Chris Suellentrop, Dead Man Writing: How to Keep Writing Your Late Father’s Books, 
SLATE, Feb. 20, 2003, http://slate.msn.com/id/2078980/ (stating that historian Stephen 
Ambrose employed members of his family to write portions of his books). 
69 See Lauren Wise, King v. Innovation Books: An Analysis of Credit Attribution with 
Respect to the Lanham Act, 1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 147, 147 (1994) (stating that 
“[a]uthors may sue under [the Lanham Act] when an erroneous credit is issued”); see also 
Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding Lanham Act cause of action 
where the plaintiff actor’s name was omitted and his role attributed to another in film 
credits); Williams v. UMG Recordings, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18400, at *17 (C.D. Cal. 
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deceptive authorial attributions were not well defined, but they did exist under 
the rubric of trademark law.70  However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. has essentially 
eviscerated the primary basis of those protections.71  In this Part, I will look at 
the law that addresses claims involving authorial attribution.  First I will turn to 
trademark law.  Then I will explain how the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dastar affected trademark protections.  Following that, I will discuss copyright 
as an alternative basis for protection.  Finally, I will consider how authorial 
attribution might still find some protections under various other regimes. 
A. Misattribution and Trademark Law 
1. Trademark’s Purpose 
Trademark law is a part of the broader law of unfair competition.72  
Contemporary trademark law originated in English common law, and the early 
trademark cases involved the regulation of products created by guilds and 
stamped with unique marks of origin.73  These marks of a trade signaled that a 
particular collective or individual identity had manufactured a particular 
tangible product.74  Trademark law evolved to protect the veracity of these 
Aug. 11, 2003) (holding that the Lanham Act claim to authorial attribution in the 
documentary credits is precluded by the Supreme Court’s Dastar decision); Follett v. New 
American Library, 497 F. Supp. 304, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting plaintiffs’ motion 
because “the Lanham Act was designed to prevent the presentation of an author’s work to 
the public in a distorted form and to protect the public and artist from misrepresentations of 
the artist’s contribution to a finished work”). 
70 See Smith, 648 F.2d at 608; Williams, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18400, at *17; Follett, 
497 F. Supp. at 313. 
71 539 U.S. 23, 38 (2003). 
72 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (declaring that 
“[t]raditional trademark infringement law is a part of the broader law of unfair 
competition”). 
73 See Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. 
REV. 29, 33 (1910) (“As early as the thirteenth century, the copying of valuable marks 
became so common and so injurious that infringement was made a misdemeanor and in 
some cases even a felony and was punished in the barbarous manner characteristic of the 
times.  The Elector Palatine in the Fourteenth Century [sic] issued an edict which, after 
reciting that the sale of spurious wine was the most outrageous form of deceit, punished by 
hanging any innkeeper who sold ordinary wine as Rudesheimer.”). 
74 See FRANK L. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO 
TRADE-MARKS (1925) (discussing the historical origin of trademarks for regulation as used 
by guilds); Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 
TRADEMARK REP. 265, 280 (1975).  But see Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1999) (suggesting that Schecter’s focus on the 
development of trademarks as guild marks ignores the importance of societal interests in 
trademark authorship). 
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attributions.75  It thus protected primarily against a particular form of consumer 
fraud, the marking of trade goods with the mark of a competitor in a manner 
that deceived the public as to the source of the product for sale.76  In 1946, the 
federal Lanham Act generally codified the common law of trademark.77  The 
reach of the Lanham Act’s federal interpretation extends beyond the federal 
sphere, however, because many state unfair competition laws are interpreted 
congruently with federal Lanham Act decisions.78
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
                          
AB Consumers
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the most common situation of trademark infringement, 
“passing off.”79  A product is, in some sense, an essential “B” product 
(meaning it is produced by entity B, sponsored by entity B, or has qualities 
associated with B) and that product is deceptively marked “A” (suggesting it is 
produced by entity A, sponsored by entity A, or has qualities associated with 
A’s goods).  The business that uses (and/or has registered) trademark “A” sues 
party B, the sellers of the competing product.80  A alleges that B’s practices are 
 
75 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) 
(“Federal trademark law . . . helps assure a producer that it and not an imitating competitor 
will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”); see 
also Lee Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright, How Intimate Should the Close Association 
Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 94 (1989). 
76 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34. 
77 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000) (codifying sections 1 to 46 of the Lanham Act). 
78 See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18400, at **26 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2003) (“The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that state law unfair 
competition claims are ‘congruent’ with Lanham Act claims; Plaintiff’s putative unfair 
competition claim would fail for the same reasons his Lanham Act claim fails.”). 
79 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 n.1 (defining passing off); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION  § 4 (1995). 
80 There is a question of standing here.  While the Lanham Act’s broader provisions 
literally read that a claim is available to “any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged” by a misrepresentation, these provisions have been limited by some 
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likely to confuse consumers into believing that the B products are produced or 
sponsored by A.  This damages A through lost sales and conceivably lost 
goodwill.  It also damages consumers because they are not receiving the “A” 
sponsored or crafted product they desired.  This is classic “passing off” – B is 
attempting to pass off its own product as A’s product.81  In order to prevail in a 
trademark infringement case, A must demonstrate that consumers are likely to 
be confused as to the source or origin of B’s product.82  A’s rights are not 
limited to an exact reproduction of A’s mark, but A may also prevail when B 
uses look-alike or sound-alike marks that are also likely to confuse 
consumers.83
As explained above, trademark protections are justified as creating 
incentives for businesses to produce quality goods (by protecting the 
usurpation of goodwill) and reducing the product search costs of consumers to 
enabling them to trust marks indicating source and origin.84  A key point to 
observe is that trademark and unfair competition law are essentially dealing 
with the regulation of communicative behaviors.85  Trademark “owners” 
possess certain rights to seek legal and equitable relief when their competitors 
engage in acts that create public deception.86  The touchstone of trademark and 
courts to those parties that can show competitive harms.  Halicki v. United Artists 
Communications, 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Conte Bros. Automotive v. 
Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998). 
81  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (1995); see also Dastar, 539 U.S. 
at 28 n.1. 
82 See 15 U.S.C. §§1117, 1125 (2000). 
83 See id. at § 1125 (setting likelihood of consumer confusion as the standard test for 
trademark infringement). 
84 See, e.g., Elmer William Hanak III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 363, 364 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark 
Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987); David G. Post, Pooling 
Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in 
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 160. 
85 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the notion of trademarks as “property 
rights in gross”).  Trademark are, however, commonly described as property interests of the 
intellectual variety.  See, e.g., Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a 
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) (exploring the equation of intellectual property 
with the legal definition of property); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of 
the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003) (exploring the intersection of property 
concepts and information); Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing 
on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1322, 1344-45 & n.138 (noting that trademarks constitute valuable assets in bankruptcy 
proceedings); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1031-32 (suggesting that the equation of property with intellectual property 
creates misleading connotations). 
86 See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 722 (2004) 
(asserting that “[c]onfusion among consumers is the grave iniquity against which trademark 
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unfair competition law is this presence of consumer confusion and deception.  
Without a likelihood of consumer confusion, there can be no cause of action 
for trademark infringement.87
Trademarks are pervasive today – packaging and advertising familiarize us 
with myriads of marks that are understood to indicate origin or sponsorship of 
the products on which they are affixed.  The animating theory of trademark 
law is that these marks are providing us with some information value.88  But 
the word “Nike” printed on a pair of sneakers clearly says nothing directly 
about the quality of the sneakers (at least to consumers not versed in 
mythology).  In order for “Nike” to be recognized as a trademark, it must have 
some information value, and therefore it must have some meaning to 
consumers.89  In other words, it must be recognized not as a word signifying 
what the word or symbol might ordinarily signify (a Greek goddess of victory, 
for instance), but instead as a mark denoting something about the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of a good.  “Apple” printed on a plastic bag 
containing apples has a non-trademark meaning. “Apple” printed on a 
computer has a secondary, trademark meaning denoting the source or origin of 
the computer.  Through our commercial and media consumption, we associate 
certain marks with particular sources of goods and services and also learn 
about certain relevant qualities of particular objects associated with the 
marks.90  Even if the public does not know what collective, corporate, socio-
geographic, or other identity corresponds to a mark, there is a notion that such 
laws and jurisprudence are intended to guard”). 
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1150 (2000); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 
428 (2003) (observing that “[trademark law] broadly prohibits uses of trademarks, trade 
names, and trade dress that are likely to cause confusion about the source of a product or 
service”).  But see Bartow, supra note 86, at 729-38 (criticizing the standard consumer 
protection rationale offered in support of trademark law). 
88 This theory has been criticized.  See Bartow, supra note 86, at 737 (“Reflection on the 
ways in which trademarks are actually deployed and employed by commercial interests 
makes the assertion that trademarks protect consumers from being confused, mistaken, or 
deceived in their purchasing decisions almost laughable, and the contention that broadly 
protecting trademarks permits consumers to rely on trademarks as accurate source indicators 
is bizarre indeed.”) (citations omitted). 
89 This is called “secondary meaning” in trademark law.  The term, as others have 
observed, is an unfortunate bit of legal jargon.  “Secondary” meaning is a good way to 
explain how Apple™ and Google™ have second meanings that differ from designations of 
a fruit and number, but the Nike swoosh, the word “Häagen-Dazs”, and many other fanciful 
trademarks actually have no primary meaning.  The word secondary is not important here – 
the particular type of meaning the word has, namely a trademark-type meaning, is 
important. 
90 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to 
Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 613, 614 (1999) (discussing the historic purpose of 
trademark law as giving meaning to names and symbols, thereby reducing consumer 
confusion). 
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a distinct identity does exist. 
When trademark law allows the average consumer to discern that there is 
some distinction between various things connected via trademarks to three 
products marked with the words “Coke,” “Pepsi,” and “Acme Discount Cola,” 
trademark law postulates that society is better off.91  (At least, it postulates, the 
benefit of regulating permissible speech in this way exceeds any costs imposed 
by the regulation.92)  It would seem that this is correct.93  Were every producer 
entitled to place the label “Pepsi” or “Coke” on any drink produced, it seems 
logical that this would lead to a sub-optimal state of information affairs, with 
no particular beverage company having a sufficient incentive to invest in a 
superior product because all producers would simply adopt the most appealing 
mark.94  Consumers would be subject to deceptive information practices in a 
world without protected trademarks: inferior producers would freely tag their 
products with the marks of superior producers.  Indeed, this seems to be 
exactly what happens.  If one visits a country where trademark laws are not 
enforced, one often encounters cheap counterfeits – substandard goods marked 
with brands that consumers erroneously believe have the same qualities as 
legitimate goods.95
In order to accept that this kind of consumer confusion is harmful, however, 
we must accept that trademarks generally signify something that is real and 
relevant to purchasing considerations.  So what does the word “Nike” mean to 
the average consumer when it is affixed to a pair of sneakers?  For the typical 
consumer, it is worth highlighting how very little information the average 
trademark conveys.  In the case of Nike, consumers may have heard some 
things about the nature, history, geographic location, finances, employment 
practices, etc., of the business entity associated with the trademark.  In most 
91 Id. at 636 (describing how trademark law “promotes competitive values”). 
92 Id. at 624 (describing trademark law as a balance of rights between producers and 
consumers). 
93 But see Bartow, supra note 86.  I agree with Professor Bartow that there is copious 
information value that trademarks fail to provide and that there is a need for trademark 
reform in some areas.  However, I believe the traditional view that consumers benefit from 
the regulation of trademarks is generally correct.  The theoretical integrity of trademark law 
relies on the ability of trademarks to benefit consumers – if trademark law were to abandon 
consumer benefit as a foundation, there could simply be no plausible theoretical foundation 
for trademark regulation. 
94 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 270 (2003); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 787 n.29 
(2004) (explaining that, without trademark law, free-riding would destroy any incentive to 
invest in a brand). 
95 Sandy Meng-Shan Liu, After WTO Accession: China’s Dilemma with the Trafficking 
of Fakes, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1153, 1157 n.19 (2003) (citing statistics on the amount of 
counterfeit goods sold in China and describing consumers’ disappointment in the quality of 
those goods). 
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cases, however, a trademark will denote next to nothing to the average 
consumer other than its own existence – it is a signifier without much of a 
signified. 96
And when we get down to it: what is Coca-Cola™, or Nike™, or Ford™?  
The words lack any clear signification.  When used to refer to companies, the 
words point to multinational Byzantine structures involving geographically 
dispersed mazes of subsidiaries, parents, and affiliate entities with overlapping 
boards.  For instance, if Hewlett-Packard were to have sold computers marked 
with the word “Compaq” in 1998, this would have unquestionably amounted to 
trademark infringement under the classic A sues B model.  Today, however, 
because A is B in that particular situation, the two formerly distinct marks are 
policed by an integrated entity.97  The oddness here is not unusual.  Some 
trademark-holding companies such as Coca-Cola™ don’t really produce 
anything, but simply license their mark to other producers.98  Multiple 
trademarks are often owned and used by a single enterprise that builds separate 
brands in order to possess different shares of the market. 
Well-known trademarks are often substantially unhinged from any 
associations with any particular things that consumers might know.  Some 
have taken this absence of clear significance as a reason for questioning why 
we protect legal interests in trademarks.99  I generally think that protection is 
sound, but clearly there is substantial complexity in claiming that trademarks 
provide the public with socially useful information.  We should say instead that 
the Coca-Cola™ mark on a product, for instance, tells us something primarily 
of legal significance.  The mark speaks of the complex web of private 
orderings and licensing that allowed it to be placed there. Trademarks are, in 
practice, almost exclusively signifiers of this type of legal ordering. 
I say “almost” for two reasons.  First, many trademarks do denote, whether 
or not the consumer knows it, particular concrete sources and persons that are 
relatively fixed.  This reality should be significant for the way we think of 
trademark law.  Second, even the most amorphous trademarks, those that are 
licensed, re-transferred, and detached from clear practical significance, are not 
completely unhinged as a legal matter from bearing significance about the 
nature of the sold object bearing the mark.  For instance, Nike could not simply 
transfer its trademark to another company that would immediately sell inferior 
96 The terms “signified” and “signifier” are used to distinguish the formal sign from the 
sign’s social meaning.  For an excellent overview of semiotics and thoughts on its 
application to trademark law, see Beebe, supra note 22, at 623-24. 
97 Michael Kanellos & Ian Fried, HP to buy Compaq for $25 billion, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Sept. 3, 2001, http://news.com.com/HP+to+buy+Compaq+for+$25+billion/2100-1001_3-
272519.html. 
98 See Hughes, supra note 18 (noting how Sara Lee also licenses its trademark to other 
dessert producers). 
99 See, e.g., ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 1-6 
(1998) (examining the cultural reappropriation of trademarks); Bartow, supra note 86. 
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shoes and brand them with the Nike™ mark, despite the fact that legal 
documents could easily be drawn that would purport to have that effect.  An 
attempted sale of a trademark interest to a business without similar goodwill 
constitutes an abandonment of the mark.100  Professor McCarthy explains: 
Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different good will 
and different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public, 
who reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same things, whether 
used by one person or another. The law’s requirement that good will 
always go with the trademark is a way of insuring that the assignee’s use 
of the mark will not be deceptive, and will not break the continuity of the 
thing symbolized by the assigned mark.101
So, according to the case law on abandonment, as summarized by Professor 
McCarthy, trademark law is not a willy-nilly legal structuring of licenses for 
signifier uses.  Other doctrine and statutory provisions in trademark law 
support this notion.  Trademarks, in theory, should point to some substantive 
“thing symbolized by the assigned mark.” 
Another indicator of the existence of a meaningful signified is the viability 
of claims of “reverse passing off.”  Reverse passing off is essentially the same 
situation described in Figure 1 above.  A product made by “B” is deceptively 
marked “A” and sold to the public.  The only difference in “reverse passing 
off,” as opposed to “passing off,” is that it is B, not A, that brings the action for 
trademark infringement.102  One might ask where the social harm accrues in 
instances of reverse passing off.  After all, there is no requirement for the cause 
of action that A acquired the product of B through improper means.  Given that 
A has possession of the good, if the marks A™ and B™ were devoid of legal 
meaning, where would be the harm if A marked goods that it rightfully owns 
with its own separate mark of “source”?  Isn’t A then the source of the 
product?  For all we know, B might decide to license A to sell B’s goods under 
the A™ mark even though A did not produce the good – thus turning a 
potential reverse passing off claim into a non-objectionable licensing 
arrangement.103  Indeed, if A’s mark is Coca-Cola™ or Sara Lee™, this is 
essentially what happens, with B essentially paying A for the privilege of using 
A™ and A contractually subjecting B to certain standards of product quality.104
But where such a licensing arrangement does not exist, and where A has 
removed or obscured B’s mark and replaced it with A™, the law for some 
100 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
18:2, at 18-6 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2005). 
101 Id. (emphasis added); Fair Undercar Care, Inc. v. Wakefield, , at *16 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 
1992) (quoting MCCARTHY). 
102  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995). 
103 Cross, supra note 20, at 730 (explaining that a producer cannot sue for reverse 
passing off if the producer consented to the rebranding). 
104 See The Coca-Cola Company, http://www.coca-cola.com (last viewed August 9, 
2005) (stating that the company’s syrup is sold by local distribution companies worldwide). 
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reason finds a cause of action.105  Why?  One can explain the claim of reverse 
passing off by understanding how it presumes the notion that a trademark 
signifies some thing.  The notion must be that B is the true producer of the 
good and that the accurate designation of B’s mark has greater positive value 
to society than the use of A’s mark.106  B’s actual production of the object, in 
the absence of a licensing arrangement with A, gives B the right to designate 
its production with its own mark – B’s claim of attribution is more true 
because B is the actual producer of the product.  Thus, A’s act of replacing 
B™ with A™ is deceptive to society (at least more deceptive than B’s 
intended marking) because A did not actually produce the product.107  Again, 
this provides evidence of the promotion of truth as a goal of trademark law. 
2. Authorship as Trademark 
If one were, simply as a thought experiment, to equate authorial attributions 
with trademarks and works of authorship with all other goods, misattribution 
would capture a situation that seems generally analogous to trademark 
infringement.108  Looking again at Figure 1, if John Doe (“B”) were to claim 
his novel was the work of John Grisham (“A”), John Doe would be liable, in 
this thought experiment, for traditional “passing off.”  Consumers would be 
deceived as to the authorship of the work, mistakenly assuming that Grisham 
wrote the novel written by Doe. 
Plagiarism, on the other hand, would be analogous to reverse passing off. 109  
If John Grisham (“A”) were to sell a novel written by John Doe (“B”) and were 
to attribute authorship to himself, he would be liable (again – only in the 
context of this thought experiment) for “reverse passing off.”110  From the 
consumer perspective, as in the standard passing off situations, the result of 
Grisham’s deception would be identical to the result of Doe’s deception.  
Consumers would mistakenly assume that Grisham wrote the novel written by 
Doe.  Because Doe would be the true author, society would be deceived.  The 
only relevant difference in the two fact patterns would be in the identity of the 
party responsible for the consumer deception. 
Importing theories of trademark to the realm of authorship appears facile at 
first.  Just as trademarks familiarize us with words and logos, the packaging 
and advertising of movies, music, and even learned legal treatises familiarize 
105  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995). 
106 See Kwall, supra note 5, at 1005 (noting that one court found reverse passing off 
objectionable because it deceives consumers). 
107 See id. 
108 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995) (defining trademark 
infringement). 
109 See Green, supra note 25, at 203 (“The analogy between reverse palming off and 
plagiarism should be clear.”). 
110 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995) (defining reverse 
passing off as marking another’s goods with one’s own trademark). 
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us with certain words that are the personal names of the authors and artists who 
created these works.  These authorial tags, like trademarks, generally have 
little initial information value to consumers.  Just as there is little or no a priori 
meaning or value in the connection of the four or five letters comprising “Dell” 
or “Pepsi” with computers and beverages, there is little value in the association 
of the strings of letters in “Steven Spielberg,” “Marni Nixon,” or “John Henry 
Wigmore” with works of film, music, or legal scholarship.  Yet by tasting 
things marked as Pepsi™ and encountering the word Pepsi™ in social 
communications and the media, we assemble a mental construct of what 
Pepsi™ means.  The same is true for authors.  Regardless of our like or dislike 
of products marked with “Tom Clancy,” most of us have some impression of 
what the word “Tom Clancy” denotes about the nature of a thing when the 
word is affixed to a novel.  When we select among an array of possible choices 
in books, movies, and music, we base our decisions as to whether or not to 
purchase a Tom Clancy novel (at least in part) upon the qualities we have 
learned to associate with Tom Clancy.111  Of course, those selling products are 
well aware of how we think about our purchases, and they know how 
particular authorial attributions, like particular trademark designations, can be 
used to sell music, books, and movies.112
The value of trademarks for cars, computers, and sneakers can wax and 
wane as brand reputations for quality and prestige fluctuate.  Similarly, various 
author tags wax and wane in value over time, as a result of changing authorial 
outputs and shifting tastes.  In 2004, Dan Brown was a “hot” author, just as the 
Apple iPod was a “hot” consumer gadget.  When deciding whether or not to 
purchase the latest Steven King, Tom Clancy, or J.K. Rowling novel, the first 
question for most purchasers may be whether they (or a trusted friend) deemed 
recent novels by that author to be quality products.113  The same is true for 
goods marked with trademarks. 
3. Authorship vs. Trademark 
My argument thus far may suggest that we can and should equate author 
names with traditional trademarks.  Yet we can’t and we shouldn’t.  Author 
names are not the same thing as “Nike” and “Coca-Cola”.  It is true that 
111 See Pinover, supra note 40, at 38 (“Publishers, record companies, movie companies 
and the entertainment industry count on known names to sell their products, just as 
trademarks sell soap and cereal.”); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (commenting that purchasers of novels are probably 
interested “primarily[] in the identity of the creator of the story”). 
112 See Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of Attribution 
Under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45 (1995). 
113 Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution and the Need for Disclosure: A Study 
of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 97 (1994) (“[W]hen 
purchasing one-time experience goods, consumers frequently rely on the advice of family, 
friends, and occasionally, consumer magazines.”). 
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personal names do transform into legally protected trademarks frequently.  
Some of the oldest and most famous trademarks originated with personal 
names, such as Disney™, Ford™, McDonald’s™, DuPont™, Tiffany™, 
Calvin Klein™, Johnson & Johnson™, Macy’s™, etc.  Yet when we buy 
products marked with Ford™ and Disney™, we are not buying the authors 
Walt Disney and Henry Ford.  We may no longer even make the mental 
association between the trademarks and the personal names that were their 
source.  Whereas personal names are used to identify persons, trademarks are 
commercial marks used to identify the origins of goods or services. 
If we were to equate names with trademarks, one problem would be that 
most personal names are not unique.  Common first names (like James, 
Michael, or John) tend to be preferred for children.114  Surnames are rarely 
original.  Many parents conjoin a traditional name with a common surname 
and children are given names that are already in current use.  If we were 
talking of trademarks, this kind of widespread use of identical marks would be 
verboten. In the context of personal names, identical names may cause 
confusion, yet it seems entirely appropriate that parents should have the 
freedom to name their children as they please without having to deal with the 
Patent and Trademark Office.  If your surname is Ford and you have named 
your son Henry (a traditional name), it seems appropriate that this “new” 
Henry Ford should be free to denote his authorship of his school writing 
assignments without a license from a certain car company. 
However, if young Henry Ford wants to use his personal name to sell 
automotive goods and services, trademark law will likely interfere.  If prior 
entrants have already established public reputations associated with marks that 
are personal names, subsequent entrants attempting to use the same names may 
be barred from utilizing their personal names in association with the sale of 
goods in related markets.115  The law does recognize that there is something 
vaguely unfair about this to the “new” Henry Ford that just wants to use his 
name to sell his automotive parts.116  Judicial opinions sometimes express the 
view that people should have an assumed right to use their own names in 
relation with business ventures if these efforts are made in good faith and 
without improper motives – even if some degree of consumer confusion results 
114 1990 Census Bureau data indicates that over ten percent of males are named either 
James, John, Robert, or Michael.  See FREQUENTLY OCCURRING FIRST NAMES AND 
SURNAMES FROM THE 1990 CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/genealogy/names (last modified Mar. 31, 2005).  Female name 
choices typically demonstrate a bit more flexibility.  See id. 
115 See Quentin R. Wittrock, Note, Use of Personal Names in Noncompeting Businesses 
– Doctrines of Unfair Competition, Trademark Infringement, and Dilution, 70 IOWA L. REV. 
995, 997 (1985) (concluding that current law may prevent a local business from using the 
same trademark as a business that operates nationally, even if the local trademark is the 
business owner’s name). 
116 See id. 
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from the use.117  Courts will therefore bend the strict rules of trademark to give 
some breathing room to business owners with personal names that might 
otherwise infringe trademarks.  However, you have no absolute right to use 
your personal name in relation with your business.118
Perhaps this impediment to personal name use is ameliorated by the fact that 
birth names are often fairly dull trademarks and one does not have to choose a 
trademark for a business or product that is identical to one’s personal name.  
And perhaps it is also ameliorated by the fact that that the marks we associate 
with our persons are flexible, from both a legal and social perspective.  
Authors and celebrities have regularly refashioned their identifying signs in 
order to facilitate self-marketing.  Marion Morrison changed his name to John 
Wayne and Prince Rogers Nelson (who was formerly known as “Prince”) 
changed his name to a symbol defying conventional articulation – reportedly in 
order to escape certain contractual restrictions.119  Skimming a random sample 
of such substitutions reveals the unsurprising fact that when authors and 
celebrities adopt new symbols to identify themselves, they pick better 
trademarks: shorter, more memorable names with more appealing 
connotations.120  It is probably also worth noting that this has often entailed the 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Though the symbol defies articulation, it has the benefit of being registered as a 
trademark and also subject to copyright protection, unlike the vast majority of personal 
names.  Judge Posner explained: 
The defendant, identified only as ‘Prince’ in the caption of the various pleadings, is a 
well-known popular singer whose name at birth was Prince Rogers Nelson, but who for 
many years performed under the name Prince and since 1992 has referred to himself by 
an unpronounceable symbol reproduced as Figure 1 at the end of this opinion.  The 
symbol is his trademark but it is also a copyrighted work of visual art that licensees of 
Prince have embodied in various forms, including jewelry, clothing, and musical 
instruments. 
Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (parenthetical comments omitted). 
120 Fabricated monikers include Woody Allen (Allen Konigsberg), Alan Alda (Alphonso 
D’Abruzzo), Anne Bancroft (Anna Maria Italiano), Pat Benatar (Patricia Andrejewski), Jack 
Benny (Benjamin Kubelsky), Mel Brooks (Melvin Kaminsky), George Burns (Nathan 
Birnbaum), Tom Cruise (Thomas Mapother IV), Tony Curtis (Bernard Schwartz), Kirk 
Douglas (Issur Danielovitch), Bob Dylan (Robert Zimmerman), Cary Grant (Archibald 
Leach), Elton John (Reg Dwight), Karl Malden (Mladen Sekulovich), Barry Manilow 
(Barry Alan Pincus), Ricky Martin (Enrique Martin Morales), Walter Matthau (Walter 
Matuschanskayasky), Chuck Norris (Carlos Ray), George Orwell (Eric Blair), Jack Palance 
(Walter Palanuik), Martin Sheen (Ramon Estevez), Ringo Starr (Richard Starkey), Sting 
(Gordon Sumner), and Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens).  For more examples, see Nom de 
Guerre, http://go.to/realnames (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).  Such monikers are not always 
voluntarily adopted.  Some performers have been pressured to use stage names.  This was 
allegedly the case with John Mellencamp (né John Mellencamp, but previously called 
Johnny Cougar, John Cougar, and John Cougar Mellencamp).  See Wikipedia: John Cougar 
Mellencamp, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Cougar_Mellencamp (last visited Aug. 7, 
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abandonment of names that signify association with an ethnic minority.121
The freedom to refashion a personal name is not unlimited or without some 
downside.  While businesses may routinely invent new marks for themselves 
and their new products and services, prior personal names are more difficult to 
abandon.  Abandoning a name entails a significant social network cost, as all 
spouses who have adopted new surnames after marriage know.122  And 
modification is not always effective where the public has grown accustomed to 
a prior signifier: Prince Nelson is still called Prince.123  Yet the flexibility to 
rename oneself is still employed for various purposes.  Female authors often 
employ pseudonyms in order to mask their gender,124 and it is not uncommon 
for authors to employ pen names for particular purposes, such as to write 
anonymously or in a form or genre with which they are not traditionally 
associated.125
The use of a personal name in relation to the sale of creative works of 
authorship, therefore, raises some interesting questions for trademark law. It 
would seem wise to avoid any simple equation of an author’s name with a 
trademark interest – especially if we want to allow later authors who share the 
personal names of prior authors to use their given names.126  Additionally, the 
requirement of secondary meaning is somewhat problematic.  Personal names 
invariably speak to consumers of a personal identity.  Whereas trademarks are 
inherently commercial and are theoretically associated with the qualities of 
2005).  Not all celebrities take or are forced to take this course – for instance, Madonna and 
Britney Spears are well known for the hyper-fabrication of their popular images, but have 
retained their birth names: Madonna Louise Ciccone and Britney Jean Spears, respectively. 
121 See Nom de Guerre, supra note 120. 
122 And of course this can, in some cases, be a choice of both spouses.  See Eric Schlacter 
Changes Name to Eric Goldman, Eric Goldman Homepage, Dec. 24, 1997, 
http://eric_goldman.tripod.com/personal/namechange.htm. 
123 See supra note 119.  Any unilateral demand that a functioning signifier should be 
replaced with a new one pointing to an identical signified runs the risk of being ignored or 
creating some social problems.  An interesting example was when, in 1966, the Chinese 
government tried to replace the standard traffic light “Red=Stop, Green=Go” signification 
with a new pro-Communist “Red=Go, Green=Stop” signification.  After numerous 
accidents, the attempt was abandoned.  See NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, CHINA WAKES: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER 70 (1994). 
124 Male author names, like non-minority celebrity names, are generally deemed to be 
more marketable, especially in genres where male adolescents may be purchasers.  See Saul 
Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191, 2210-11 (1996) (discussing “cross-
penning”).  While some female authors employ male pseudonyms, others simply mask their 
gender identity by using initials rather than their first names.  See id. 
125 See id. at 2207-15 (discussing pseudonymity).  Professor Laura Heymann makes the 
observation that these “authornyms” share many of the qualities of trademarks.  Heymann, 
supra note 17, at 1378. 
126 See Wittrock, supra note 115 (discussing when personal names may be used as 
trademarks despite their lack of uniqueness). 
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goods,127 personal identities are neither of these things.  Yet it is clear that 
names of authors can and do acquire the same type of commercial significance 
and secondary meaning that we associate with marks.  Famous authors 
demonstrate that the personal name of an author or artist can accumulate the 
goodwill and selling power that is associated with a trademark.  Pseudonyms 
and stage names demonstrate that personal names as signifiers can be made 
flexible and optimized for selling power, just as trademarks are.128  In terms of 
the power of names to denote a real and meaningful signified that has 
information value to the public, personal names are arguably superior to 
trademarks because they point to actual persons.  Thus, one might argue that 
they are more deserving of legal, trademark-type protections.  Confronted by 
the strong reasons for recognizing some trademark-like interest in a personal 
name, courts historically allowed creative authors to pursue trademark-like 
actions where their names function much like unregistered trademarks.129
Where the marketing of a work created consumer confusion as to the 
authorial “source” of a work, trademark law provided a legal mechanism for 
authors to bring claims based upon the misattribution of their creative efforts.  
There are many examples, but a well-known case in this vein is Follett v. New 
American Library.130 A publishing company, William Collins Sons & 
Company Ltd., had employed (then relatively unknown) author and journalist 
Ken Follett to make editorial revisions to a book named The Heist of the 
127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION  § 4 (1995). 
128 See supra note 120. 
129 Because personal names were rarely registered as trademarks, courts generally 
applied Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000)), which 
states, in relevant part: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce 
any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . or any false designation of origin . . . 
which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods . . . shall be liable in a civil action 
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
See also Pinover, supra note 40, at 40 (“Although artistic identity may not be thought of as a 
traditional trademark, it should not be surprising that Section 43(a) provides artists and 
authors protection for the proper attribution of their products.  The trademarks or 
identifications of source are their names.”); id. at  43-44 (discussing Follett v. Arbor House 
Publishing, 1980 US Dist. LEXIS 13287 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1980)); id. at 44-45 
(discussing Geisel v. Poytner Products, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)); id. at 45-
46 (discussing Lamonthe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1988)); id. at 
46-48 & n.30-35 (discussing other cases involving claims of artistic misattribution under the 
Lanham Act); Gulick, supra note 113, at 112-13 (recounting cases where the Lanham Act 
was used successfully to prevent instances of misattribution); Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral 
Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1218 (2002) (“Courts often interpret the 
prohibition against ‘reverse passing off’ in 43(a) as providing authors with a legitimate right 
to seek proper credit for their work.”). 
130 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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Century.131  The book described a factual event: a bank robbery and 
subsequent trial.  Three anonymous French journalists had collaborated in 
writing the book. It was to be published under the joint pseudonym “Rene 
Louis Maurice.”132  Follett made extensive revisions to the original work.133  
As a result of his editorial modifications, he requested a byline on the title and 
some copyright interest in the revised works.  The copyright request was 
denied, but it was agreed that the novel would attributed to “Rene Louis 
Maurice with Ken Follett.”  The book was published in England in 1978 with 
“Rene Louis Maurice” alone listed on the cover, and “with Ken Follett” 
included on the title page.  The book failed to find a publisher in America.134
Subsequently, Ken Follett published Eye of the Needle, which became a best 
seller in the United States.135  As Follett’s fame grew, an American publishing 
company, Arbor House, contracted with the owners of the copyright in The 
Heist of the Century to republish the book under the title The Gentlemen of 16 
July.  The jacket cover that was planned read: “by the author of TRIPLE and 
EYE OF THE NEEDLE: KEN FOLLETT with Rene Louis Maurice.”136  It 
was planned that Follett’s name would be the only name on the spine of the 
book and would appear in letters roughly twice the size of the French authors’ 
pseudonym on the cover.  Follett learned of the plan and brought suit. 
After dispensing with claims based on copyright and the New York state 
publicity laws, the court arrived at what it perceived to be the heart of the case.  
“The key issue, then, is whether the designation of authorship which Arbor 
House proposes to utilize on the cover of The Gentlemen of 16 July constitutes 
a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act . . . .”137  The court concluded 
that 
although Follett’s revisions may have been more substantial than those 
which an editor would ordinarily perform . . . it is misleading to depict 
him as the principal author of The Gentlemen of 16 July. His 
contributions display none of the special creative attributes which are 
associated with authorship. Thus, the representation that Follett is the 
principal author of the book is literally false. . . .  The Lanham Act . . . is 
designed . . . to protect the public and the artist from misrepresentations 
131 Id. at 306. 
132 Id. at 305 
133 Id. at 306. 
134 Id. 
135 KEN FOLLETT, EYE OF THE NEEDLE (1978).  Eye of the Needle was actually a re-
publication of his novel Storm Island, which had already been printed in England in 1977.  
Ken Follett Library: Eye of the Needle, http://www.ken-follett.com/bibliography/eye.html 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2005). 
136 Follett, 497 F. Supp. at 308. 
137 Id. at 312-13. 
  
1200 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1171 
 
 
of the artist’s contribution to a finished work.138
Follett succeeded in invoking the Lanham Act to enjoin the publication of 
the book with the proposed misleading designation of authorship.139  It should 
be noted that none of the cases like Follett that applied the Lanham Act to 
claims of authorial misattribution were capable of articulating a coherent 
theory of exactly what authorship was and how it intersected with the 
protections granted by trademark law.  Indeed, the court in the Follett case 
declared at one point in the opinion that matters of authorship were difficult to 
theorize: 
The concept of authorship is elusive and inexact. Although I do not 
presuppose to offer a definitive analysis of qualities which give rise to 
authorship, some such definition is essential to a resolution of the issue 
before the court. The parties have cited no cases in which the concept of 
authorship has been carefully dissected, and this court has discovered 
none.140
Yet despite this admission, the court did not shy away from the issue, but 
instead sallied forth into the difficult task of ascertaining the truth of claims 
about authorship.  Follett and similar cases were united by a common belief 
that designations of authorship, like trademarks, could be determined to be true 
or false designations, could mislead consumers as to salient qualities of goods, 
and that protection under trademark law was thus required.141  However, all 
those cases are no longer reliable precedent after the Supreme Court’s recent 
holding in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,142 which I will 
turn to next. 
B. The Dastar Decision 
The Supreme Court’s most prominent intellectual property decision in the 
2003 term was undoubtedly Eldred v. Ashcroft,143 decided in January.  In 
Eldred, a seven Justice majority of the Court upheld a Congressional extension 
of copyright terms by twenty years in the face of a constitutional challenge.144  
Turning to trademark law in March, the Supreme Court issued Moseley v. V 
Secret Catalogue, Inc.,145 which, as a practical matter, severely limited the 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 313. 
140 Id. at 312. 
141 King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 831 (2d Cir. 1992) (locating the harm of 
misattribution in consumer deception); Geisel v. Poytner Prods, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 348-
53 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discussing whether any injury to the plaintiff or public deception 
occurred in the copyright context). 
142 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
143 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
144 Id. 
145 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
  
2005] TRADEMARK FUNCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 1201 
 
 
power of the poorly worded and controversial 1995 Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act.146  In June, the Supreme Court trimmed back trademark law yet 
when it decided Dastar. 
The factual background of the Dastar case is complex.  In 1948, shortly 
after the end of World War II (and shortly before Eisenhower’s successful 
presidential campaign in 1952), Doubleday & Company published Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s “personal account of World War II,” entitled Crusade in 
Europe.147  The attribution of authorship to Eisenhower was clearly an 
intended selling point for the book, just as the attribution to Follett was 
intended as a selling point of The Gentlemen of 16 July.  The front of the dust 
jacket was taken up with a portrait of a serene and smiling Eisenhower in 
military uniform against a blank background.  The back inside dust cover bore 
a ringing endorsement from Allan Nevins, described as an “eminent historian.”  
Nevins informed the reader that one of the chief merits of the book was the 
identity of the author: 
Above all, [the book] expresses the personality of the author.  Readers 
will feel this is General Eisenhower speaking.  That fact, indeed, is one of 
the chief merits of the work.  It has an air of genuineness, a ring of 
sincerity; the tone is that of a leader, a serene, highly sagacious leader 
pouring out his special knowledge with the heartiest desire to tell the truth 
about himself and others.148
Crusade in Europe sold very well – it was even a Book-of-the-Month 
Club® selection – and this created a demand for a video adaptation.  
Doubleday licensed exclusive television rights to an affiliate of Twentieth 
Century Fox so that a television series could be produced.149  Fox contracted 
with Time, Inc. for the production, and the television series produced in 1949 
was also called Crusade in Europe.150  Time then assigned its copyright in the 
television series back to Twentieth Century Fox.  Doubleday renewed its 
copyright in the book in 1975.  Fox, however, failed to renew the copyright in 
the video footage in a timely manner.151  Thus, while the copyright in the book 
continued, the copyright in the video expired in 1977.152  Crusade in Europe 
146 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).  The Supreme Court’s requirement of a showing of 
“actual injury” to bring a cause of action for trademark dilution effectively checked the 
expansion of the dilution remedy into a broader property right.  See Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).  Trademark dilution has always been a controversial 
doctrine and, as Professor McCarthy has noted, is often misinterpreted by district courts.  3 
MCCARTHY § 24, supra note 100, at 24-108 to 24-112. 
147 Id. at 25-26. 
148 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE (1948) (dust jacket) (on file with 
author). 
149 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25-26. 
150 Id.  at 26. 
151 Id. at 23. 
152 Id. 
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(the video) entered the public domain, that realm of information matter in 
which no copyright subsists.153
At the end of the twentieth century, there was a renewed interested in World 
War II accompanying the fiftieth anniversary of many of the war’s events.  The 
blockbuster film Saving Private Ryan was released along with a slew of other 
entertainment products.  Dastar, a small Oregon corporation, saw an interesting 
opportunity in the public domain video footage of Crusade in Europe.  It took 
the original footage (obtained from original copies), re-edited that footage 
slightly, and released it in 1995 as a seven-video set sold under the name 
World War II Campaigns in Europe.154  Dastar must have recognized that the 
sale of a video that relied heavily on references and passages from a book, 
Crusade in Europe, would create potential copyright issues.  So Dastar 
removed all video passages making references to the book.  Dastar probably 
also feared that references to the original attributions of authorship to 
Twentieth Century Fox and Time might create trademark issues – so Dastar 
deleted the original film credits that appeared within the original video.155  The 
Dastar version of the footage contained a new credit sequence, which was 
limited to the names of the Dastar editors.  Each of the seven Dastar videos 
began with the words “Dastar Presents . . . .”156
Fox, also anticipating the anniversary of the World War, re-acquired the 
book’s video adaptation rights and arranged for the re-release of Crusade in 
Europe.157  Fox did not appreciate the competition from Dastar, which was 
essentially selling the same Crusade in Europe footage at half the price.  Fox 
brought suit, alleging that by removing the original authorial credits to 
Twentieth Century Fox, Dastar had engaged in authorial misattribution, 
implicitly claiming that it had authored the video.158 Fox alleged this violated 
federal trademark law by creating consumer confusion as to the source and 
origin of the video footage.  Doubleday, co-plaintiff, alleged that the copies of 
the video footage were derivative works that infringed Doubleday’s copyright 
in the original book.159
Both Fox and Doubleday prevailed in the district court.  Fox’s victory was 
directly attributable to the Ninth Circuit’s “bodily appropriation” standard.160  
153 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990) 
(characterizing the public domain as the stock of raw material from which most creative 
work is derived). 
154 WORLD WAR II: CAMPAIGNS IN EUROPE (Dastar 1995). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26. 
158 Id. at 27. 
159 Id. 
160 See Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the bodily 
appropriation test); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining the 
scope of the Lanham Act). 
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The standard was addressed particularly to the situation where trademark law 
was applied to claims involving the authorship of materials protected by 
copyright.  A similar (slightly more expansive) standard was being used in the 
Second Circuit.161  Essentially, both the Ninth Circuit’s “bodily appropriation” 
and the Second Circuit’s “substantial similarity” tests merged elements of 
copyright and trademark law by allowing a presumption of consumer 
confusion under trademark law where a substantial portion of a creative work 
of authorship was misattributed.  Thus, an evidentiary showing of copyright-
like similarity between creative works served to trigger a presumption of 
trademark infringement.  The district court in Dastar found, pursuant to the 
applicable doctrine, Dastar’s actions amounted to a willful violation of the 
federal Lanham Act.162  It awarded Fox not only Dastar’s profits of 
$1,567,213.66, but also attorney’s fees totaling $1,481,898.163  Doubleday was 
awarded statutory damages of $150,000 for copyright infringement. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded 
Doubleday’s copyright claim with regard to the book due to a factual question, 
but affirmed the ruling in Fox’s favor with regard to the Lanham Act claim. 164  
The Ninth Circuit decision was unpublished.  The Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari to Dastar’s petition for review was therefore something of a surprise.  
Amicus parties generally assumed that the Supreme Court took the case in 
order to strike down the standards in use by the Ninth and Second Circuits.  
Because the standards were a judicial doctrine that amalgamated the subject 
matter of copyright and the mechanism of trademark, they did seem prone to 
legal challenge – clear support for the unique standard could be found in 
neither body of law.165  Thus, a frequent argument in the amicus briefs was that 
the bodily appropriation standard (and the Dastar decision by extension) was 
161 Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 783 (2d Cir. 1994); see also 
Kwall, supra note 5, at 1005 (describing the “bodily appropriation” test and the Second 
Circuit’s substantially similar “substantial similarity” test). 
162 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27-28. 
163 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22064, at 
*34 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000), vacated sub nom. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
Entm’t Distrib., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7426, at **315-16 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2002). 
164 The Ninth Circuit found there were triable issues of fact with regard to Doubleday’s 
claims to copyright ownership.  Doubleday argued that, under the copyright statute, it was 
the original “author” of the book because Eisenhower had produced the book as a “work for 
hire.”  Twentieth Century Fox, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7426, at *314; but see id.  (“The sale 
agreement between Eisenhower and Doubleday also gives no indication that the book was a 
work for hire.”).  The work for hire doctrine is discussed briefly in Part III.C. infra. 
165 Amicus briefs were filed by several interested parties, many of which made these 
arguments.  See, e.g., Brief of Malla Pollack and Other Law Professors on Question One 
Supporting Dastar Corp., Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428); Brief of the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 
02-428); Brief of the American Library Association et al., Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-
428); Brief of the International Trademark Association, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428). 
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erroneous as a matter of trademark doctrine because it failed to require 
evidence of consumer confusion.166
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Dastar, as expected.167  However, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion did more than merely negate the aberrant hybrid 
doctrines.  Instead, the Court made a sweeping statement about the scope and 
nature of trademark law.  In language that has been cited by numerous district 
court opinions in the past two years, the Court stated that the scope of 
trademark law was limited to the misattribution of “the producer of the 
tangible product sold in the marketplace.”168  The implications of this 
pronouncement are startling.  According to the Court, if Dastar had taken the 
Fox videotapes, removed an attribution to Fox and resold the tapes with a 
Dastar label, this type of misattribution would have been actionable pursuant to 
the Lanham Act as “reverse passing off.”169  However, because Dastar actually 
produced the physical videotape and only copied the intangible expression, the 
Court found that Dastar had not violated the Lanham Act by attributing the 
origin of the videotape to itself.170  Query what difference this would actually 
make to consumers.  Yet, bizarre as it may seem, that is what the opinion of the 
Court says.171
Though subsequent district courts have uniformly relied on this “tangible 
product” language, other interpretations of the case have been proffered in 
166 See supra note 165; see also 3 MCCARTHY § 24.03[2], supra note 100, at 24-13. 
167 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38. 
168 Id. at 31.  District court opinions citing this language include Gen. Universal Sys., 
Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 149 (5th Cir. 2004); Smith v. New Line Cinema, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18382, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004); Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, 350 
F. Supp. 2d 613, 617 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design Consultants, 
Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1129 (D. Kan. 2004); Bob Creeden & Assocs. v. Infosoft, Inc., 
326 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Tao of Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs. 
& Materials, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. Va. 2004); Carroll v. Kahn, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1357, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. 
Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971-72 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Boston Int’l Music, Inc. v. Austin, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2003); and Williams v. UMG 
Recordings, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
169 The Court stated that a claim for reverse passing off “would undoubtedly be sustained 
if Dastar had bought some of New Line’s Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them 
as its own.”  Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31.  Oddly, this result was exactly the converse of what 
Professor John Cross (who joined an amicus brief on behalf of Dastar) had cogently argued 
was the proper policy direction to take for claims of reverse passing off.  See Cross, supra 
note 20, at 766 (“In conclusion, then, the special characteristics of the artist justify granting 
a limited cause of action for reverse passing off to artists, but not to others.”); id. at 772 
(“The only case in which reverse passing off can be justified is when a work of art, 
literature, or music is involved.”). 
170 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32 (understanding “origin of goods” to refer to the producer of 
the physical videotape). 
171 The opinion spoke for eight Justices.  Justice Breyer was recused.  Id. 
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academic commentary.  By far the most common interpretation of Dastar in 
law review articles and student Notes has been that the case constituted a 
victory for the public domain.172  In other words, because the Supreme Court in 
Dastar failed to apply trademark law to prohibit the sale materials that had 
been previously protected by copyright but which had fallen into the public 
domain, the decision ensured that public domain materials would be maximally 
free for public use without being encumbered by restrictive intellectual 
property protections.173  Professor Jane Ginsburg has suggested that some 
members of the Court may have seen Dastar as an act of contrition for Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, a decision that many criticized for failing to vigorously protect the 
public domain.174
Two amicus briefs submitted by groups of law professors in Dastar had 
172 See, e.g., Jessica Bohrer, Strengthening the Distinction Between Copyright and 
Trademark: The Supreme Court Takes a Stand, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 23, 27-28 
(“The Court . . . was rightfully concerned that allowing the line to blur in a case such as this 
would create a state of ‘perpetual copyright protection’ that could nullify the intent and 
effect of copyright and trademark law.”); Hughes, supra note 18, at 32 (“Where Eldred 
accepted Congress’s 20 year extension of copyright – thereby sharply curtailing what will 
go into the public domain for decades – Dastar shows the Court to be highly protective of 
the public domain.”); Lynn McLain, Thoughts On Dastar From a Copyright Perspective: A 
Welcome Step Toward Respite for the Public Domain, 11 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 91 
(2003) (“It is to be hoped that the Court will continue the work that it has begun.  The public 
domain’s borders . . . must not be permitted to be truncated by other bodies of law . . . .”); 
Kurt M. Saunders, A Crusade in the Public Domain: The Dastar Decision,  30 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 161, 178 (2004) (calling the decision “wise” and stating that “[i]n 
the end, what Dastar teaches, if nothing else, is that unless a valid intellectual property 
right, such as a patent or copyright, protects something, it may be freely copied and 
distributed without attribution”); Richard Ronald, Note, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 243 (2004) (“[T]he Dastar Court frees 
manufactures [sic] to use public domain works without fear of a burdensome attribution 
requirement.”); Joshua K. Simko, Comment, “Every Artist Is a Cannibal, Every Poet Is a 
Thief”: Why the Supreme Court Was Right To Reverse the Ninth Circuit In Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 355, 356 (2004) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court correctly decided Dastar); Eugene Quinn, Dastar v. Fox: Public Domain 
Wins in the U.S. Supreme Court, JURIST (June 4, 2003), (calling the decision “a victory 
for . . . the public domain”). 
173 With regard to the public domain, see generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 
(2003) (relating the English enclosure movement to intellectual property rights).  See also 
Litman, supra note 153, at 996. 
174 Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 267 (“In what some might see as an act of contrition for 
having upheld copyright term extension in Eldred v. Ashcroft, [Dastar made clear] that a 
work’s entry into the public domain precludes resort to another federal intellectual property 
statute, the Lanham Trademarks Act, to achieve a de facto prolongation of exclusive 
copyright-like rights.”). 
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argued for reversal primarily based on public domain arguments.175  These 
arguments did appear to have some influence on Justice Scalia’s opinion: the 
Court explicitly stated that creating a right of authorial attribution under 
trademark law would have the detrimental effect of regulating the free use of 
public domain materials under a “species of mutant copyright law.”176 The 
public domain is generally equated with the absence of intellectual property 
regulations, so there is clearly some truth in seeing Dastar as a victory for the 
public domain.  But in the case of intellectual property laws that prevent 
consumer deception, the absence of regulation does not always serve the public 
interest.  In any event, the brief nod toward the public domain did not seem to 
be the driving force behind the Dastar decision.177  No subsequent district 
court decisions have accorded this language much consequence and all courts 
to consider the issue have been willing to extend Dastar’s holding to works not 
in the public domain.178
A second notable view in the scholarly commentary is that the Court’s 
opinion in Dastar rested on an erroneous conclusion of “amateur psychology,” 
namely a faulty empirical belief that consumers didn’t actually care about the 
175 Professor Tyler T. Ochoa filed an amicus brief on behalf of himself and other law 
professors.  See Tyler T. Ochoa, Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Law Professors 
in Support of Dastar Corporation, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 931, 931 (2004).  Professor Malla 
Pollack also submitted a brief on behalf of herself and nine legal scholars.  See Pollack, 
supra note 165. 
176 The full sentence reads: 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar’s representation of itself as the 
“[p]roducer” of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative 
work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that 
representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s 
“federal right to ‘copy and to use,’” expired copyrights. 
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted and emphasis added).  Note that “mutant copyright 
law” precedes the description of the effects of the putative monstrosity on the public 
domain.  Evidently the “mutant copyright” language was borrowed from the petitioner’s 
brief, which was co-authored by UCLA law professor David Nimmer.  See Nimmer, supra 
note 18, at 60 (“Happily for Justice Scalia (as well as for the U.S. justice system), his own 
opinion in Dastar eliminates any right to maintain that those words in the Court’s opinion 
represent reverse passing off, thus forestalling my colleagues and me from calling him to the 
bar!”). 
177 But see Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 269 (“Despite this so-far unflinching application 
of Dastar to still-copyrighted works, one should recognize that the rationale behind the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of attribution rights in copyright-expired works does not extend 
to copyright-protected works.”); Patchen M. Haggerty, Authors’ Claims for Reverse Passing 
Off Under the Lanham Act after Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
FINDLAW, Mar. 22, 2004, http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Mar/22/133354.html (“As 
evidenced by the foregoing analysis of the rationale underlying the Court’s Dastar decision, 
the Court’s holding is only meant to preclude a claim for Reverse Passing Off under the 
Lanham Act for works that are in the public domain.”). 
178 See supra note 168 (listing notable cases that have cited to Dastar). 
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creative authorship of the products they purchase.179  The evidence generally 
cited is the following statement: 
The consumer who buys a branded product does not automatically 
assume that the brand-name company is the same entity that came up with 
the idea for the product, or designed the product – and typically does not 
care whether it is.  The words of the Lanham Act should not be stretched 
to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.180
This does seem strange. Obviously, from the perspective of those 
purchasing many works of authorship, this statement is simply wrong.  Most 
fiction consumers do not purchase books based on the identity of the 
publishing house, they purchase on the basis of, among other things, the 
author.  (Other factors may include the subject matter, the book reviews, and 
perhaps how pretty the cover is.) The problem with placing too much emphasis 
on amateur psychology here is that the Court itself acknowledges, in the very 
next paragraph, that the observation does not hold true in the case of 
communicative works.  The Court’s statement about the cares of consumers is 
probably missing a “generally” – it is true about the consumers of most 
products protected by trademark law.  In the special case of creative works, 
however, the Court itself stated: 
The purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity 
of the producer of the physical tome (the publisher), but also, and indeed 
primarily, in the identity of the creator of the story it conveys (the 
author).  And the author, of course, has at least as much interest in 
avoiding passing-off (or reverse passing-off) of his creation as does the 
publisher.  For such a communicative product (the argument goes) “origin 
of goods” in § 43(a) must be deemed to include not merely the producer 
of the physical item (the publishing house Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or 
the video producer Dastar) but also the creator of the content that the 
physical item conveys (the author Tom Wolfe, or – assertedly – 
respondents). 
 The problem with this argument according special treatment to 
communicative products is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict with 
the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically. 181
The court further observed that 
179 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Seventh Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies 
Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law: The Trademark Jurisprudence of the 
Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 204 (2004); Hughes, supra note 18, at 
33 (observing that Justice Scalia “tells us a strange tale about the psychology of 
consumers”); Marshall Leafer, Life After Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of 
Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597, 1614 (2004) (“I am particularly interested in 
knowing the author’s name and I suspect many others hold a similar view.”). 
180 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33. 
181 Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
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as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase “origin of goods” is in our view 
incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or 
communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain. Such an extension 
would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of accord with the 
history and purpose of the Lanham Act and inconsistent with 
precedent.182
Clearly, the Court recognized that consumers often care about authorship, 
and that the purchaser of a creative artifact may even care primarily about 
authorship.  However, the central holding of Dastar – and the holding 
understood by district court opinions applying Dastar – is that the “the 
producer of the physical tome” is permitted to look to trademark law for 
misattribution protections, whereas “the creator of the story it conveys (the 
author)” must use copyright law.183
A final notable argument found in the secondary commentary is that the 
Dastar ruling might be limited in scope because claims of “false advertising” 
might still be used to address authorial misattributions.  My first concern with 
this possibility is that the Court speaks generally, throughout the opinion, of 
trademark law and the scope of “§ 43(a).”  False advertising under the Lanham 
Act is a part of “§ 43(a).”184 At one point, the opinion does state that a claim 
under § 43(a)(1)(B) might be viable under certain circumstances in relation to 
claims about the content of a communicative product.185  But this language 
deserves careful attention, because it doesn’t seem to go far enough to protect 
against authorial misattribution. The exact situation the Court identifies as 
actionable under § 43(a)(1)(B) is a situation where “the producer of a video 
that substantially copied the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, 
to give purchasers the impression that the video was quite different from that 
series.”186
This hypothetical situation seems highly unlikely as a practical matter.  Why 
would anyone, especially someone seeking to misattribute authorship, want to 
claim, in advertising or promotion of the work, that the misattributed work 
being offered is “quite different” from a prior work that is, in fact, nearly 
identical?  Has there ever been any creative work, in any genre, promoted and 
advertised as being “quite different” from another particular work that is a 
nearly identical copy?  The Court’s hypothetical situation concerns an 
affirmative claim of “difference” that has little to do with reality.  But more 
important, it has little to do with claims of authorship. 
Yet, as stated previously, some very erudite commentators have held out the 
possibility that the issues presented by Dastar might be resolved by looking to 
182 Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
183 Id. at 33. 
184 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
185 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38. 
186 Id. 
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the niceties of pleading.187  Fox should have claimed misattribution under the 
false advertising provisions of the trademark law, § 43(a)(1)(B), instead of 
section § 43(a)(1)(A), which addresses confusion over the origin of goods.  
While it is possible that some subsequent district court interpreting Dastar 
might take this approach, it hasn’t happened yet.  Instead, courts have spoken 
broadly about § 43(a) and Dastar’s tangibility limitations.188
187 See Nimmer, supra note 18, at 44 & n.255 (suggesting that affirmative authorial 
misattributions are still actionable pursuant to § 43(a)(1)(B) where the attribution claims 
made are of consequence to purchasers, and thanking Professor McCarthy for “elucidating 
this point”).  But see Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (“As a backup argument, Bretford contends that Smith was guilty of ‘false 
advertising’ . . . .  But Dastar blocks that argument as well.”); 2 MCCARTHY § 10.26.1, 
supra note 100, at 10-63 (rather carefully stating that after Dastar, “to trigger Lanham Act § 
43(a) claims, false claims of creation of the intellectual property content of a product must 
fit within the false advertising prong of § 43(a)(1)(B)”); Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 269 
(“Whether or not the actor or I can still allege false designation of origin, the Dastar Court’s 
reference to subsisting section 43(a)(1)(B) claims . . . may in some instances preserve a 
Lanham Act right of action for authors and performers.”). 
188 See, e.g., Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. World Trade Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 131, 149 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (“GUS has not accused HAL of taking tangible copies of its software, removing 
its trademarks, and selling them as its own.  Rather, GUS asserts that HAL copied the ideas, 
concepts, structures, and sequences embodied in its copyrighted work . . . .  Dastar makes 
clear that such claims are not actionable under § 43(a).”); Bob Creeden & Assocs. v. 
Infosoft, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879-80 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (dismissing a Lanham Act claim 
based on misattribution of a software program because the system at issue was the allegedly 
infringing copy of the plaintiff’s software system, not the original software itself); Tao of 
Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs. & Materials, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. 
Va. 2004) (finding that misattributed ideas and concepts in a proposal did not violate the 
Lanham Act because the allegedly misattributive proposal was physically produced by the 
defendant); Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design Consultants, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 
1126 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding unaccredited copying of proposals was not a violation of the 
Lanham Act, and commenting that “[e]ven if plaintiff authored some of the ideas and 
concepts embodied in those proposals, the Lanham Act does not provide protection for such 
plagiarism”); Smith v. New Line Cinema, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18382, at **9-10 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004) (“As the Supreme Court recently made clear, the Lanham Act 
protects only ‘the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not . . . the 
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.’ . . .  In light of 
Dastar, Smith, as the alleged author of the screenplay embodied in the tangible good offered 
for sale, is not the originator of the film.”) (citations omitted); Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. 
Chronicle Books, LLC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16180, at *11 (E.D. Pa. August 11, 2004) 
(“[B]ecause Defendants are the physical producers – the fabricators, so to speak . . . they 
cannot be held liable under §  43(a)(1)(A) even if they are not the creators of the pictures at 
issue.”); Carroll v. Kahn, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17902, at **16-17 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 
2003) (interpreting reverse passing off under the Lanham Act to be limited to cases 
involving the tangible goods actually produced by the plaintiff); Boston Int’l Music, Inc. v. 
Austin, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2003) (finding “reverse 
passing off” to be limited to cases involving tangible goods and “declin[ing] to construe § 
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This brings us back to the language about tangibility.  It is hard to accept 
that the Supreme Court could have meant to draw such a bright, radical, and 
theoretically destabilizing line between copyright and trademark, yet 
subsequent district court opinions suggest that Dastar has removed authorial 
attribution protections from the scope of trademark law – because authorship is 
intangible.189  Perhaps the better reading of the opinion would be to limit it to 
cases involving “communicative products.”190  Perhaps the best subset of the 
possible scope of “tangibility” would be to restrict the limit of Dastar to 
information products potentially covered by copyright law.  If Dastar is, at its 
core, about placing authorial misattribution concerns in the realm of copyright 
law (and this seems to be a plausible reading), this approach may be a way of 
cabining its scope.  But if copyright now governs authorial attribution, what 
does that mean for society?  The next section addresses this question. 
C. Misattribution and Copyright 
 
    The [copyright] law was designed as a deterrent to plagiarism.191
 
According to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dastar, copyright law is the 
constitutional and statutory vehicle that addresses the attribution of works of 
creative authorship.192 Justice Scalia said that copyright speaks to authorial 
attribution “specifically.”193  While Justice Scalia was clearly thinking of a 
43(a) of the Lanham Act to require attribution to plaintiff [and alleged co-author] Johnson 
for ‘I Like It,’ where the defendants here are the ‘origin’ of the product they recorded, 
produced, and sold on their own.”); Williams v. UMG Recordings, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18400, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2003) (“Plaintiff would have a claim if Defendants 
purchased copies of Plaintiff’s goods (i.e. the film) and repackaged them as their own.  By 
contrast, Plaintiff does not have a claim for his authorship and direction embodied in that 
film.  His claim, therefore, is barred as a matter of law.”). 
189 See supra note 188 (listing notable lower court interpretations of Dastar).  There are 
many reasons this distinction makes no sense, but the most obvious is that trademark law 
regularly protects trademark rights in relation to the provision of services, which may be 
intangible. 
190 But see Bretford Mfg,, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72 (finding that defendant’s sale of a 
table that incorporated a leg from plaintiff’s table was not reverse passing off because 
Dastar’s holding was not limited to “communicative products”). 
191 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 393 (1940).  The language 
is taken from the syllabus, though the opinion also seems to conflate those who infringe 
copyrights with plagiarists.  Id. at 405 (“Petitioners stress the point that respondents have 
been found guilty of deliberate plagiarism . . . .”). 
192 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) 
(interpreting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8). 
193 Id.  It is clear in the context of the opinion that Justice Scalia was thinking of the 
Visual Artists Rights Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000), as the section of the 
copyright statute that “addresses that subject.”  As discussed in this section, that Act is a 
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narrow provision in the copyright statute – the Visual Artist Rights Act 
(“VARA”) – it might not seem odd for a member of the public to think that 
copyright would be the proper statutory regime that would address the 
misattribution of authorship.194  After all, copyright law is often associated in 
the popular mind with prohibiting and policing plagiarism.  The writer of the 
syllabus in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., an often-cited Supreme 
Court copyright opinion from 1940, clearly believed this to be the case.195
Yet contrary to the impression one might gain from reading the many 
judicial opinions that conflate copyright infringement with plagiarism, there is 
actually no law prohibiting plagiarism and misattribution generally.196  While 
the copyright statute spells out in voluminous (some might say agonizing) 
detail the specific quasi-proprietary rights related to the performance, 
reproduction, broadcast, and display of expressions via particular methods and 
technologies, it almost entirely ignores attribution interests.197  Unlike 
European copyright regimes, which grant “moral rights” to authors, the 
copyright law of the United States ignores the attribution concerns of authors 
almost entirely.198
1. The Meaning of VARA 
One significant exception to this is found in the provisions of VARA that 
Justice Scalia apparently had in mind.  VARA is generally recognized as an 
effort on the part of the United States to come into greater compliance with 
“moral rights” treaty obligations pursuant to the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.199  On March 1, 1989, the United 
States was required to recognize and implement a legal order where, 
small exception to the general rule that copyright does not speak to attribution interests. 
194 See Green, supra note 25, at 200 (noting how “copyright infringement is sometimes 
loosely referred to by courts as ‘plagiarism’”). 
195 Sheldon, 309 U.S. at 393. 
196 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (explaining that the courts have not recognized plagiarism 
generally as a prohibited act); Green, supra note 25, at 171; Kwall, supra note 5, at 955 
(explaining that copyright law does not specifically protect against misattribution); cf. 
Saunders, supra note 172, at 161 (summarizing Dastar as follows: “[t]he Lanham Act does 
not provide a claim for trademark infringement for what is essentially an act of plagiarism”).  
Indeed, the absence of a clear remedy for “plagiarism” has been the case for quite a while.  
See Henry Goudy, Plagiarism: A Fine Art, 20 JURID. REV. 302, 302 (1909) (“In its modern 
sense plagiarism cannot be said to be a crime punishable either by English or Scottish law, 
or, so far as I am aware, by any European code.”). 
197 17 U.S.C. § 101-106 (2000) (setting forth exclusive rights). 
198 See Gulick, supra note 113, at 91-92 (comparing and contrasting European and 
American approaches to copyright); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the 
Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1994); Suhl, supra note 129, at 1203-15 (comparing 
VARA with moral rights protections in European law). 
199 See Hughes, supra note 18. 
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independently of an author’s economic rights, the law would protect an 
author’s “right to claim authorship of the work” and certain other “moral 
rights.”200  VARA was enacted the subsequent year.201  Clearly there is good 
reason to suspect a causal link here, and the legislative history of VARA fully 
supports such a connection.202  It has been claimed that the enactment of 
VARA was needed for full compliance with the Berne Convention.203  
However, it has also been claimed that VARA was narrowly drafted because 
United States compliance with Berne had been substantially achieved though 
protections afforded by other regimes of law, most notably the trademark 
protections that existed prior to Dastar.204  The current status of United States 
compliance with Berne is therefore unclear. 205
But whatever the reasons for VARA’s enactment, VARA protects authorial 
attribution and “moral rights” only for a very limited set of works: namely, 
original works by visual artists who produce single works, limited edition 
prints, or sculptural casting in editions of less than 200.206  As a practical 
matter, this limitation essentially ensured that VARA would serve to protect 
the idealized “fine artists” who sell physically original paintings and sculptures 
in small galleries, but would leave the hugely profitable commercial copyright 
industries (e.g., publishing, film, music, and software) untouched.207  Outside 
200 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 51 
(“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said 
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”); see generally Hughes, 
supra note 18. 
201 H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 at 24 (1990) (reporting bill’s passage by the Judiciary 
Committee); Netanel, supra note 198, at 4.  
202 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 at 7-10 (describing how VARA was prompted by U.S. 
accession to the Berne Convention). 
203 See, e.g., Suhl, supra note 198, at 1215 (summarizing VARA as a United States 
concession to Berne that “grants a bundle of Moral Rights to a limited group of visual 
artists”). 
204 See Corey Field, Berne Goes to the Movies, COPYRIGHT WORLD, July-Aug. 2003, at 
23, 24-25. 
205 This is an interesting issue that I will leave to others to explore.  See id. (noting the 
potential conflict between the holding in Dastar and the Berne Convention); Hughes, supra 
note 18. 
206 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “work of visual art”); 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) 
(providing special protections for such works). 
207 Cross, supra note 20, at 735 (“[VARA] is too narrow to serve as a general source of 
Reverse Passing Off.”).  It should be noted that not all gallery artists are protected.  For 
instance, the works of Thomas Kinkade, “Painter of Light,” are reproduced in copious 
numbers and thus would probably not qualify as being “work[s] of visual art” under the 
statute despite the fact that they are displayed and sold in galleries.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101; 
The Official Thomas Kinkade Website, http://www.thomaskinkade.com (last visited Aug. 
12, 2005). 
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the limited context of VARA works, copyright law has not protected 
attribution interests at all.208  Thus, Justice Scalia’s statement that § 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act is incapable of speaking to authorial attribution because 
copyright “addresses that subject specifically” is a very powerful statement 
regarding the current status of attribution interests: it suggests that there are 
virtually no such protections (except for visual artists producing limited edition 
or unique works) and that this is by design.209
However, it is unclear exactly what Justice Scalia was saying when he spoke 
of the conflict between copyright and trademark.  If he was attempting to 
interpret what Congress had intended when it passed or amended the Lanham 
Act, it is hard to follow how the Congressional passage of special attribution 
protections for a discrete subset of original artistic works in 1990 somehow 
illuminated the intent of Congress in the passage of the original version of § 
43(a) of the Lanham Act in 1946 (or later major amendments to § 43(a) made 
in 1988).  And if the notion was that VARA was intended to clarify the limited 
federal regulation of authorial attribution (and preempt any other efforts to 
regulate attribution), the legislative history of VARA makes this a very strange 
proposition.  It has been cogently argued that the legislative history of VARA 
suggests that the Lanham Act § 43(a) protections were considered important to 
meeting the country’s obligations under the Berne Convention.210  The 
existence of alternative avenues of relief for authors makes a fairly good 
explanation for the very limited scope of VARA’s attribution protections.  
There doesn’t seem to be any support for the contention that Congress enacted 
VARA with the intent to entirely occupy the field of authorial attribution 
protections.211
208 Professor Jane Ginsburg and Justin Hughes have both suggested that the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act may also protect attribution interests by outlawing intentional 
removals of “copyright management information” that is conveyed in connection with the 
work.  See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 283; Hughes, supra note 18, at 16; see also 17 U.S.C. 
1202(c) (2000).  This is an interesting observation, but, as of this writing, it has apparently 
not been utilized or endorsed by a court.  See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 283-86 (failing to 
cite any cases endorsing this approach). 
209 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003). 
210 See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 281-82 (explaining U.S. obligations under the Berne 
Convention); Hughes, supra note 18, at 3 (describing the Lanham Act as the “keystone” of  
U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention). 
211 The most plausible (and, at the same time, the most radical) reading of the conflict 
would be one that did not focus on Congressional intent, but on some form of constitutional 
preemption instead.  The import of this reading, however, would be extremely destabilizing 
for numerous other areas of law.  For instance, it could conceivably affect other non-
copyright schemes protecting authorship rights, including state laws concerning 
misappropriation and rights of publicity.  See, e.g., Toney v. L’Oreal, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 
908-09 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that the Illinois right of publicity statute is not preempted by 
the Copyright Act based on Congressional intent, but not reaching the constitutional 
preemption analysis, which might have altered the outcome). 
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2. Copyright as Collateral Attribution Protection 
Yet even if copyright doesn’t explicitly speak to attribution outside of 
VARA, does this mean that copyright law does not address attribution?  It 
might be argued that copyright protects attribution in a collateral fashion.  By 
protecting works of creative authorship as property, copyright enables the 
contractual protection of attribution.  If an author can control the dissemination 
and reproduction of her work pursuant to copyright law, copyright law will 
grant her the contractual leverage to protect her attribution interests.  In fact, 
this doesn’t follow nearly as neatly as one might assume, for two essential 
reasons.  First, if we think attribution should be about providing incentives to 
authors, the fact is that copyright as property does not always provide any 
attribution-related incentives to people who we would ordinarily identify as 
authors.  Second, social attribution interests are not necessarily aligned with or 
served by “attribution rights” that are exclusively granted to authors. 
Taking the first issue, the Supreme Court in Dastar seemed to argue that 
there is an inherent difficulty in fixing credit for authorship.  In refusing to 
hold that an author could be held to be the “origin” of a work under the 
Lanham Act, Justice Scalia stated:  
Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word “origin” has no 
discernable limits.  A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones, after its 
copyright has expired, would presumably require attribution not just to 
MGM, but to Oscar Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which the 
film was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the opera on which the 
musical was based), and to Prosper Mérimée (who wrote the novel on 
which the opera was based).  In many cases, figuring out who is in the 
line of “origin” would be no simple task.212
The Court is right that determining authorship is “no simple task.”  But is 
this fatal to the project? Copyright law, by granting an initial monopoly 
reproduction and performance interest exclusively to “authors” who originate 
creative works has long had to struggle with the difficulty of determining who 
is an author that originates a work.  In cases such as Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,213 the Supreme Court had to determine who was 
the “author” of a photograph – the photographer or the subject.  This was “no 
simple task,” but it was managed.214  The Supreme Court and lower courts 
212 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35.  It is worth noting how closely Scalia’s refusal to accept the 
very concept of original authorship in this passage seems to comport with the above-
mentioned post-structuralist criticisms of authorship and originality.  See, e.g., Boyle, supra 
note 49, at 642-43 (questioning whether attempts to ascertain the intent of the framers can 
guide constitutional interpretation in light of post-structuralist critiques).  This seems 
somewhat ironic given Justice Scalia’s well-known hermeneutic inclinations. 
213 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
214 Id. at 58-59 (holding that the photographer, not the subject, was the author of a 
photograph). 
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have regularly engaged in non-simple tasks without throwing their hands in the 
air. 
The end result of all this cogitation, however, has not led to anything simple.  
Instead, the result – predictably – has been to transform what was a vague 
social concept of authorship into a legal term of art that is governed largely by 
case law and statutory provisions.  The legal definition of “author” has 
diverged substantially from its popular definition.  A legal “author” may, in 
some cases, be an employer who hires an employee to create a work.215 
Copyright in such a case protects the employer-author’s interest, but not the 
employee’s interest.  The definition of “author” is further clouded in the case 
of collectively authored works.  A “joint work” under the copyright statute is 
“a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.”216  However, because the statute does not define the term “author” in 
the first place, it is unclear how wide the circle of joint authorship should be 
drawn in copyright law.  In some cases it is drawn, like the work for hire 
provisions, inconsistently with popular understandings of authorship.217
The divergence between legal and popular constructions of the notion of 
authorship is perhaps best illustrated by the Ninth Circuit case of 
Aalmuhammed v. Lee.218  In that case, Spike Lee employed Denzel 
Washington to play the role of Malcolm X in the eponymous film.219  
Washington turned for advice to Muslim scholar Jefri Aalmuhammed, who 
eventually (and without a “work for hire” agreement), re-wrote passages of the 
215 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (setting forth various definitions but failing to define 
“authors”); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (stating that an employer can be “considered the 
author”); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (defining a 
“work for hire” in terms of an author’s employment status); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 
Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067-69 (7th Cir. 1994); see also 17 U.S.C. §101 (defining a “joint 
work”): 17 U.S.C. § 201 (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person 
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, 
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, 
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”). 
216 17 U.S.C. § 101.  Some courts have imposed an additional requirement that the 
contributions of each “joint author” should be sufficiently original and expressive to be 
subject to copyright separately.  See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506-07 (2d Cir. 
1991) (discussing cases that explore the concept of a “joint work”); Mary LaFrance, 
Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint 
Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 196 (2001) (presenting alternate tests to determine if a joint 
work exists). 
217 See generally F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of 
Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225 (2001). 
218 202 F.3d 1227, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1999) (establishing a narrow definition of “joint 
work” for motion pictures). 
219 Id. at 1229. 
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film script and added new scenes and characters.220  Despite Aalmuhammed’s 
clear creative contribution to the collective enterprise of the movie, the Ninth 
Circuit found that Mr. Aalmuhammed was not an author of the movie, because 
his role was too indirect to be considered “authorial.”221  The court found, 
instead, that the sole author of the film was the film company, pursuant to 
work for hire agreements.222
Many scholars have expressed discomfort with the result in 
Aalmuhammed.223  For instance, Martha Woodmansee has suggested that the 
Aalmuhammed case demonstrates the continuing vitality of a “romantic notion 
of authorship” that ignores collaborative creativity and instead gives legal 
primacy to a quasi-mythological notion of the artist as a solitary genius.224  
Many others have criticized the mythology of the “romantic author” as a 
means to expose what they see as a flawed ideology animating the copyright 
statute.225 Whatever one makes of these critiques, the Aalmuhammed case and 
the work for hire doctrine reveal that the notion of authorship in copyright law 
and the notion of authorship in popular culture can be incongruent.  Copyright 
law at times seems willing to provide counter-intuitive determinations of who 
is a legal author, and thus entitled to legal ownership and proprietary control of 
creative works.  If one believes there is a societal interest in accurate 
attribution, copyright’s scheme of authorship ordering is obviously problematic 
because the legal author controlling attribution is not the person society views 
as the author.226  Jefri Aalmuhammed clearly has no ability at this point, via 
copyright law, to control how Warner Brothers decides to attribute the scenes 
he authored (but did not legally author).  Even thought he did not contribute to 
the film under the standard work for hire contract, he was still found to lack a 
220 Id. at 1231-32. 
221 The court’s reasoning was notably tautological.  See id. at 1235 (“Too open a 
definition of author would compel authors to insulate themselves and maintain ignorance of 
the contributions others might make.”).  In other words, in order to effectively encourage 
authors to work together, not all authors can be authors. 
222 Id. at 1235 (“Warner Brothers required Spike Lee to sign a ‘work for hire’ agreement, 
so that even Lee would not be a co-author and co-owner with Warner Brothers.”). 
223 See Dougherty, supra note 217, at 325 (discussing the unfairness and possible 
economic inefficiency of the joint authorship doctrine); Martha Woodmansee, Response to 
David Nimmer, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 231, 234-35 (2001) (critiquing the underlying theory of 
authorship in the Aalmuhammed case). 
224 Id. at 234 (using the case as an example in the course of “defend[ing] the continuing 
relevance of literary studies in the discourse of copyright”). 
225 Theories regarding the intersection of romantic authorship, copyright, and literary 
theory enjoyed a heyday of sorts in the early 1990s.  See generally supra note 60; cf. Jane 
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (1990) (critiquing various assertions with regard to the 
rationales animating copyright law). 
226 Gulick, supra note 113, at 66 (“What does it mean to have an author who is not the 
creator of his work?”). 
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proprietary interest in his creative contributions to the film. 
3. The Attribution/Copyright Mismatch 
This is not to say that the Aalmuhammed case reached the wrong result as an 
issue of social policy.  If the case is understood as deciding the proper 
proprietary control of the copyright in the film Malcolm X, it may well reach 
the right result.  There are legitimate reasons, related to economic efficiency, 
that copyright law might attempt to shift copyright ownership from the hands 
of a diverse set of contributors (including those like Jefri Aalmuhammed) to 
single “dominant” employers and authors.227  To the extent copyright law 
evinces a coherent theory, it is best understood in the United States as a system 
designed for the purpose of maximizing the generation and popular distribution 
of new works.228  It can be argued that shifting ownership of copyright into the 
hands of an eager and well-financed exploiter that funds production is the best 
way of ensuring the distribution of the collaborative works to markets.  If we 
see authorship simply as a system for efficiently parceling out proprietary 
ownership rights, the law should grant ownership (denoting it as “authorship”) 
to the most efficient distributors and exploiters of works.  Again, the problem 
with this model – from the standpoint of attribution – is that the non-statutory, 
non-dominant author lacks the control to secure attribution. 
Even where authors have nominal control over the copyright in their work, 
the problem of misattribution is not solved.  There are several reasons for this.  
First, authors may suffer from unequal bargaining power vis-à-vis publishers 
and distributors.  Compared to the commercial publishers and exploiters of 
creative material, aspiring authors are generally impecunious and legally 
unsophisticated.  The established industry players, secure veterans of the 
process, can generally exert their greater power to obtain written assignments 
of copyright in exchange for negotiated compensation.  After an author 
alienates the copyright in a creative work, the United States copyright statute 
generally provides few mechanisms for that author to reclaim control over the 
exploitation of the work.  (VARA is an exception to this rule.229)  Again this 
accords well with a utilitarian, property-centric view of copyright.  By 
minimizing encumbrances restricting subsequent exploitation, copyright, in 
227 But see Dougherty, supra note 217, at 324-25 (arguing that a liability rule would be 
more efficient than a property rule). 
228 Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for 
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 238 (2003) (arguing that “copyright aims to 
alleviate the market’s failure to give adequate incentives for producing expressive works”); 
Green, supra note 25, at 202 (noting that copyright law protects primarily economic 
interests). 
229 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).  The mechanism of statutory termination rights are another 
way authors might reclaim proprietary control of their work, but the mechanism only comes 
into play several decades after the work’s creation.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2000) 
(allowing authors to reclaim rights during certain periods after having sold those rights). 
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theory, enables the alienation of a maximum amount of authorial interests in 
order to maximize authorial incentives.  By maximizing the amount of control 
that authors may transfer, the law maximizes the value of the work that can be 
transferred for payment.  Of course, in cases of unequal bargaining power, and 
in cases where third parties can suffer from the effects of private transactions, 
the simple goal of maximizing the power of free markets can be questioned. 
A second problem with relying on authors to use copyright to obtain 
attribution is that a copyright exists only for a limited period.230  When 
copyright lapses, the ability to police against misattribution also fades away.  
Even assuming Shakespeare once had a copyright that he would have asserted 
to protect against misattribution, the plagiarism of Shakespeare today would 
fall outside the scope of attribution protections.  From the standpoint of 
incentives for Shakespeare to produce new works (the concern of copyright), 
this is just fine.  Shakespeare is dead.  From the standpoint of the social 
distribution of his works this is also fine.  Fewer restraints will lead to greater 
distribution.  But from the standpoint of consumer protection with regard to 
misattribution, it is a problem.  This concern about the social effects of 
misleading communication is why trademark interests, unlike copyright 
interests, have no temporal limitations.231
Finally, and perhaps most seriously, policing attribution by using authorial 
control has a glaring structural defect.  Authors often have incentives to 
misattribute creative authorship, deceiving society as to the authorship of 
creative work when this deception can provide them with benefits. This 
possibility will be explored in more detail in Part III. 
D. Misrepresentation and Other Legal Mechanisms 
Of course, even in the absence of copyright and trademark protections, there 
still exist private causes of action that regulate the use of authorial attributions 
in ways that contribute to the protection of societal interests.  For instance, 
there are numerous state statutory vehicles that permit actions against parties 
that engage in commercial fraud or misrepresentation.  In the case of consumer 
purchases of deceptively attributed works of authorship, such claims would 
hardly be worth the cost of a legal complaint for individual purchasers.  If 
aggregated in a class action vehicle, however, they might have some chance of 
succeeding.232
230 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003) (citing 
the Constitution’s Copyright Clause in upholding Congress’s power to extend the term of 
copyright). 
231 See 3 MCCARTHY § 24.03[2], supra note 100, at 24-13 (describing the purposes of 
trademark law). 
232 The class action vehicle is obviously a whole issue of its own.  It is worth noting, 
though, that in at least one case where a class action strategy was attempted to remedy an 
authorial misattribution, it proved unsuccessful.  For a discussion of the misattributions of 
authorship engaged in by the band Milli Vanilli, see Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137 
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The most obvious possibility, however, is one that has been employed 
successfully by authors in the past: rights of publicity.233  Many state laws 
recognize a quasi-proprietary right of publicity that permits a cause of action in 
cases where a party makes an unauthorized use of a person’s identity for 
commercial purposes.234  These state rights of publicity could be effective in 
policing attributional concerns.235  Where Party A claims that a seller has 
“passed off” a creative work by claiming that it was authored by A, when it 
was in fact authored by B, Party B appears to be exploiting Party A’s identity 
for commercial benefit.236  In instances where an author’s name is used without 
F.R.D. 225, 227-28 (E.D. Pa. 1991): 
Stating that nowhere on the outer covering of the album package do the names of 
Morvan and Pilatus appear, [defendant] avers that plaintiffs have assumed incorrectly 
that 7,000,000 persons purchased albums because Morvan and Pilatus were perceived 
as the actual singers.  Defendants submit that individual testimony of each class 
member would be necessary to determine on what basis he or she made the purchase 
because the gravamen of the complaint is fraud.  Essential to the claim of fraud is proof 
of reliance which may vary greatly among purchasers. 
See also id. at 229 (“What causes a person to respond positively to a performance is a 
complex matter, especially in these modern times where popular musical performances 
involve visual as well as auditory stimulation.”). 
233 See Mark A. Lemley, Rights of Attribution and Integrity in Online Communications, 
1995 J. ONLINE. L. art. 2. 
234 The theoretical foundation of the right of publicity is unclear.  It originally stemmed 
from prohibitions against tortious invasions of privacy.  Currently, it seems to sound in the 
proprietary concerns of copyright, but obviously can be employed in “sponsorship” 
circumstances highly similar to those which give rise to unfair competition claims.  See J. 
Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The Right of 
Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 198 (2000) 
(“The right of publicity is not a kind of trademark.  It is not just a species of copyright.  And 
it is not merely another kind of privacy right.  It is none of these things, although it bears 
some family resemblance to all three.”).  For a well-known critique of the right, see Michael 
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. 
L. REV. 125, 178-237 (1993).  For a response, see Kwall, supra note 25, at 3. 
235 But this is not always a certainty by any means.  For instance, in the Follett case, the 
New York Civil Rights law was found inapplicable to the situation, because Ken Follett 
gave permission to use his name and did not have a copyright in the underlying work.  See 
Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  Another 
interesting possibility would be a claim of defamation, if the misattributed work was 
sufficiently damaging to an author’s reputation. 
236 See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. MacIntosh, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9917, at 
*25 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1992) (finding that the sale of t-shirts bearing performer names such 
as “John Cougar Mellencamp” violated both Section 43(a) and rights of publicity).  See also 
David W. Melville & Harvey S. Perlman, Protection for Works of Authorship Through the 
Law of Unfair Competition: Right of Publicity and Common Law Copyright Reconsidered, 
42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 392-93 (1998) (noting the historical expansion of publicity rights 
to cover distinguishing features like a singer’s voice); Pinover, supra note 40, at 54-63 
(explaining the similarities and differences between state publicity rights and attribution 
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permission to sell a work of creative authorship that he did not create, authors 
can assert rights of publicity, and such claims have been successful.237 Yet 
rights of publicity as a mechanism for attribution protection have problems 
similar to those addressed above with regard to copyright.  Because rights of 
publicity are often conceived of as something in the nature of property 
interests, they can effectively allow name “owners” the freedom to manipulate 
usages of authorial attribution.238  In other words, because concerns about 
consumer deception are not at all integral to the theory of rights of publicity,239 
it would raise no red flags under the right of publicity for A to license B to sell 
a book attributed to A but written by B.  If one believes authorial attribution 
protections are simply a matter of parceling out certain absolute grants to 
authors, rights of publicity seem to protect authorial rights fairly effectively (at 
least in the case of direct “passing off”).  Yet the protection of societal interests 
in accurate attribution is entirely ignored. 
In Part III, I will briefly delve into the dilemmas raised by private market 
orderings of proprietary rights in attribution and credit.  My concern is that 
such systems, post-Dastar, may come to dominate and displace trademark-
based theories.  Indeed, this is not so much a speculative concern as it is the 
current state of affairs.  If we seek to protect social interests in accurate 
authorial attribution, no amount of copyright, rights of publicity, or proprietary 
“moral rights” will fully correct the problems raised by Dastar.  Indeed, 
handing out more property rights to more authorial owners may ultimately 
make things worse for society.  Until and unless we look to trademark’s anti-
deception theories to fix the result of Dastar, awarding new attribution “rights” 
will simply introduce a new stripe of property-like protection to an already 
crowded (arguably overcrowded, overcomplicated, and under-theorized) field 
of law. 
claims under the Lanham Act). 
237 See, e.g., Winterland Concessions, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9917, at *25. 
238 Pinover, supra note 40 (“Publicity rights do not have the same economic utility as 
trademarks.  If consumers are not misled, there is no confusion in the product content 
conveyed to the consumer, and therefore, the consumer is not better able to predict anything 
about the product.  Without consumer predictability, consistent quality in the product is not 
encouraged. . . .  Courts are justifiably cautious when dealing with a celebrity monopoly in 
an image.”); id. at 63 (arguing that consumer utility is enhanced by trademark protections 
for attribution, but is not enhanced by monopolistic proprietary schemes such as rights to 
publicity and moral rights). 
239 See Estate of V.C. Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1292-96 (E.D. Va. 
1994) (using the principle of publicity rights to determine the value of an estate, but not 
taking into account the use of the deceased Andrews’s name by another author as part of the 
publicity rights analysis); McCarthy & Anderson, supra note 234, at 201 & n.39 (noting that 
“deception or false endorsement is not required to prove a case of infringement of the right 
of publicity”). 
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III. AUTHORSHIP, CONSUMERS, AND COLLABORATION 
 
How can we know the dancer from the dance? 240 
 
In this Part, I will be looking at specific practices of authorial misattribution 
and fluid crediting.  There are three points that I wish to make.  First, 
attribution-shifting practices often occur in the marketing of information 
products for simple economic reasons.  Second, there is a real potential for 
consumer deception in such practices, because authorial attribution, unlike a 
trademark, often points directly to a particular and relevant factual proposition 
about the circumstances of production and the qualities of a product.  Third, 
some degree of this type of credit shifting is inevitable simply because there 
are significant limits in how far trademark can and should protect attributions 
of authorship.  In the case of large-scale collaborative productions and in the 
case of authorship confusion that is intrinsic to a work, misattributions of 
individual authorship are probably not worth the social effort of policing.  
However the “authorship” in such cases lacks much of the unique value that 
has been discussed previously in this article.  The associations of the names of 
directors and actors with large-scale collaborative film projects is not so much 
an issue of authorial attribution as it is a standard trademark issue of 
sponsorship and branding. 
In order to explore these points, I will look at a few specific instances of 
credit-shifting practices in the promotion and sale of copyright-protected 
works.  I will start out with some examples of ghostwriting.  Ghostwriting 
seems a paradigmatic example of the differences between authorship concerns 
and standard trademark law.  Neither the application of property-based 
attribution “rights” nor the application of standard trademark principles seem 
to be a very good fit for the protection of social interests in ascertaining 
authorship. 
A. Ghostwriting 
Ghostwriting is perhaps as old as authorship itself.  Of course, this doesn’t 
mean it is a good thing.  Mahesh Grossman’s recent book, Write a Book 
Without Lifting a Finger, states that its target audience is anyone who 
“fantasizes about seeing their name on a real published book.”241  (Without 
lifting a finger, of course.)  In its most aggressive form, where the attributed 
author writes nothing and the ghostwriter is completely unacknowledged, 
ghostwriting is pure plagiarism.242  In return for literary labor, the ghostwriter 
240 WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Among School Children, reprinted in THE COLLECTED 
POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 215 (Richard J. Finneran II ed., 2d ed. MacMillan 1996). 
241 MAHESH GROSSMAN, WRITE A BOOK WITHOUT LIFTING A FINGER (2003).  Presumably, 
Mahesh Grossman wrote the book, but who knows? 
242 As stated above, plagiarism is essentially the misattribution of authorship.  See supra 
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accepts financial compensation as a quid pro quo for a lack of credit.243  For 
instance, in the case of Hillary Clinton’s book It Takes A Village, a ghostwriter 
was allegedly paid $120,000 to provide literary services and, apparently in 
return, the existence of the ghostwriter was not disclosed on the book’s cover 
or in the acknowledgements.244  Acknowledgement may be granted to a 
ghostwriter, but since the whole premise of ghostwriting seems to be about the 
misattribution of authorship, the more credit the ghostwriter gets, the less the 
activity appears like ghostwriting and the more it appears like collaboration.  
Ghostwriting is popular because it makes abundant market sense for both 
parties in the transaction.  The fame of a politician, an athlete, a five-star 
general, or some other celebrity, can create a public demand for works of 
authorship created by that person.  However, creative authorship generally 
requires substantial time, effort, and some degree of writing skill.  Celebrities 
may not possess the time or skill, or be willing to invest the effort to produce 
quality authorial works.245  On the other hand, many skilled authors possess 
time and talent, but lack the popular appeal or fame that might allow them to 
sell their works to the public.  So obviously, both the employer and the ghost 
have something worthwhile to gain from misleading the public as to the 
authorship of a literary work. 
If one were to take an “authorial rights” approach to attribution and 
ghostwriting, it should be clear that the practice would be unproblematic.  If a 
ghostwriter (“B”) is paid to attribute her novel to the exclusive authorship of a 
well-known celebrity (“A”), this act is consensual among A and B.  If the 
public is deceived by this misattribution of authorship, this is not problematic 
from the standpoint of either A or B.246  Even under analogies to trademark 
law, this type of “name licensing” seems unexceptional.  A is simply licensing 
B to produce certain goods bearing the A™ mark.247  In order to say that any 
note 66. 
243 The Follett case, discussed supra Part II.A.3, gives a standard example of this kind of 
negotiation for authorial credit.  Follett v. New Am. Library, 497 F. Supp. 304, 313 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) 
244 Charles Paul Freund, Living Hillary: The Art of Ghost-Reading, REASON ONLINE, 
June 17, 2003, http://reason.com/links/links061703.shtml (criticizing Clinton for her alleged 
use of a ghostwriter for the books Living History and It Takes a Village). 
245 Tomas Kellner, Under Cover, FORBES.COM, July 7, 2003, 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0707/096.html (“Publishers covet celebrities, or even 
quasi-celebrities . . . who offer juicy stories and built-in brand recognition.  Fame brings big 
bucks: Bill Clinton will earn a reported $10 million for his book, Whoopi Goldberg $6 
million and Ozzy Osbourne’s clan $3 million.  The hitch: ‘Very often these people don’t 
have a clue how to read a book, much less to write one,’ says Richard Pine, a New York 
book agent.”). 
246 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing how commercial trademarks do 
not represent a single entity but a web of contractual relationships among producers of 
goods or services). 
247 See id. 
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harm is occurring here, we must assert that there is something about an 
inaccurate designation of authorship that can be misleading and potentially 
damaging to the public.248  In the case of a claim of individual authorship, it is 
not difficult to see that this is the case.  Where the author is claimed to be a 
person, and not an amorphous symbol, attribution posits some meaningful 
connection between signifier and signified.  If a consistent style of authorship 
can be ascertained from a careful scientific analysis of a given work,249 then to 
say that a person is an author is to point to a proposition that can be factually 
true or false.  This proposition is arguably much more significant than any 
thing pointed to by a trademark. Thus, misattributions of authorship may create 
harms to consumers that are more serious than the harms created by the 
misleading use of trademarks. 
Yet ghostwriting demonstrates that such deceptions are sometimes 
“licensed” by both the true and falsely credited authors.  Even celebrated 
writers have ghostwriters.  It may seem odd to think that those who gain their 
fame through the labors of literary art would be inclined to let others write 
under their names, but it happens.  Tom Clancy, for example, is a world-
famous author of spy thrillers such as The Hunt for Red October, Patriot 
Games, and The Cardinal of the Kremlin.250  His success with these books has 
been leveraged into a multi-media empire of films, computer games, and 
television programs.251  Tom Clancy’s Op-Center: Line of Control is one book 
in an Op-Center series currently being sold in stores.  The name “Tom Clancy” 
appears five times on the front and back cover of the paperback (including in 
80-point type on the top of the cover). 252 
The Op-Center books, however, were all written by Jeff Rovin.253  Line of 
Control’s cover does, in a very small typeface on the bottom of the front cover, 
declare it was “written by Jeff Rovin” – although only after it states (in 
addition to all the other Clancy marks) that the book was “Created by Tom 
Clancy and Steve Pieczenik.”  This is likely somewhat confusing to the 
average consumer.  Line of Control was shelved at my local library, by author, 
in the “C” section.254  (Perhaps this misshelving might be explained by the fact 
248 See 3 MCCARTHY § 24.03[2], supra note 100, at 24-13 (characterizing the purpose of 
trademark law as the prevention of consumer confusion leading to inefficient purchasing). 
249 See supra note 8 (describing high-tech tools for determining the identities of authors 
and artists). 
250 Wikipedia: Tom Clancy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Clancy (last visited Aug. 
12, 2005). 
251 Id. (reporting on Clancy’s many novels, ghostwritten novels, films, and videogames). 
252 JEFF ROVIN, TOM CLANCY’S OP-CENTER: LINE OF CONTROL (2001) (displaying 
Clancy’s name prominently on its cover). 
253 Id. 
254 I actually spoke briefly with my township librarian about this.  She concluded that the 
book was technically misshelved.  In subsequent visits, I’ve noticed that the book remains 
technically misshelved. 
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that the first six books in the Op-Center series reportedly did not indicate on 
the cover that Rovin was also the author of those books.255) 
Tom Clancy did not collaborate in writing the Op-Center books, at least as 
most consumers would understand that word.  He apparently brainstormed a 
bit, in a telephone conversation, the basic concept of a television series upon 
which the books are based.256  He then contracted to allow Rovin to write the 
Op-Center books under his name.257  Many purchasers, however, were 
understandably unaware of the underlying circumstances of the “creation” of 
the book by Clancy.  Instead, many purchasers seemed to read the Op-Center 
series with the mistaken impression that Tom Clancy actually wrote the books.  
On Amazon.com, some volunteer reviewers of Tom Clancy’s Op-Center: Line 
of Control have praised the book as, e.g., “an excellent thriller by Tom Clancy” 
while others have panned the book by stating, e.g., that “Tom Clancy is clearly 
overreaching in this incoherent and rambling book set in Kashmir.”258  Other 
reviewers express disappointment with the quality of the writing coupled with 
a statement that the purchaser mistakenly believed that Tom Clancy had 
something to do with the book’s authorship – but the reviewer has since 
grasped the truth.259  According to recent news reports, Clancy is complaining 
that the Rovin-authored Clancy books are destroying his authorial reputation – 
yet he finds himself unable to escape from his contract with Rovin.260  Of 
255 See Roger Friedman, Tom Clancy’s Jack Ryan Replaced by Gen-X Version, FOX 
NEWS, Aug. 1, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,93515,00.html (stating that 
Rovin’s name did not appear on the first six installments of the Op-Center series). 
256 See Arthur Santana, Judge Set to Rule on Clancy Venture, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 
2004, at T3 (reporting that Clancy became interested in the “Op-Center” project as a 
planned miniseries). 
257 See Friedman, supra note 255. 
258 See Amazon.com Reviews of Tom Clancy’s Op-Center: Line of Control, 
http://www.amazon.com (search “Line of Control,” then follow “Line of Control” link in 
results list) (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005). 
259 The pseudonymous reviewer “Big Dog,” from Christchurch, New Zealand, wrote: 
I based my purchase on two things.  One, I thought Tom Clancy had something to do 
with it. And two, the blurb on the back seemed interesting.  Well, I was mislead on 
both counts.  I cannot for the life of me spot any influence from Tom Clancy – there is 
truly something wrong in the literary world when the cover of the book has the author 
in the smallest letters at the bottom.   
Id.  Something also might be read into the fact that used copies of Tom Clancy’s Op-Center: 
Line of Control were on sale in 2004 on Amazon.com at the price of one penny (plus 
shipping).  Id. 
260 See Nancy Kercheval, Tom Clancy Seeks New Fans amid Turmoil with Ex, THE 
DAILY RECORD, Aug. 30, 2004, available at 
http://www.mddailyrecord.net/pub/5_51_monday/businessnews/159181-1.html:  
Clancy . . . has branded several series, including the “Op-Center” series of 14 books 
and the video game ‘Splinter Cell.’  [T]he books . . . have declined from sales of 1.7 
million to just under 600,000, despite commanding advances of $2.25 million for the 
next two installments . . . .  Clancy’s former wife . . . whom he divorced in 1999 after 
  
2005] TRADEMARK FUNCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 1225 
 
 
course, this has led to litigation.261 
Another world-famous author, Virginia Cleo Andrews, is also having books 
produced under her name.  V.C. Andrews gained her fame by writing pulp 
horror novels involving troubled young girls surviving perverse torments 
inflicted by demented adults.262  The appeal of this niche may be elusive to the 
adult reader – and publishers didn’t see it at first either.  Flowers in the Attic, 
Andrews’s first novel, was rejected seven times before it found a publisher in 
1977.263  After publication, however, the book became a phenomenon, finding 
popularity with (of course) young girls.264  A few years after Flowers in the 
Attic was published, V.C. Andrews was an international literary star, securing 
million-dollar advances for her novels.265  However, she increasingly felt 
trapped in her “troubled children” niche.  She made two efforts in the 1980s to 
break away from stories of suffering children and demented adults – but her 
publisher rejected both.266  Little did she know how long she would be trapped 
in the profitable formula.  In 2003, one could find copies of the new V.C. 
Andrews novel Midnight Flight for sale in bookstores everywhere – another 
story of “troubled girls” subject to mistreatment by demented adults.267  The 
cover of Midnight Flight states that the book is “[t]he thrilling sequel to Broken 
Wings – from New York times bestselling author, V.C. Andrews.”  The name 
“V.C. Andrews” is emblazoned on the book in 160-point drop-shadow and 
relief letters.268
Yet V.C. Andrews did not write Midnight Flight or many other books 
attributed to her.  She died in 1986.269  After her death (and apparently without 
ever having ascertained her preferences in the matter) her publisher was 
suddenly struck with the idea of continuing to produce books attributed to the 
30 years, challenged his decision to withdraw his name from ‘Tom Clancy’s Op-
Center’ series, saying the books would be worthless . . . .  Circuit Judge Warren J. 
Krug . . . ruled that Clancy’s right to his own name is ambiguous, and therefore, 
allowed the lawsuit to proceed.  
(on file with author).  
261 Id. (noting the judge’s decision to allow the suit to go forward).   
262 Estate of V.C. Andrews v. United States,  850 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (E.D. Va. 1994) 
(describing the characteristics of the genre and Andrews’s success with it). 
263 Id. 
264 Id. (stating that the genre “was particularly appealing to teenagers and young 
women”). 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 1282. 
267 V.C. ANDREWS, MIDNIGHT FLIGHT (Pocket Star 2003). 
268 Id. 
269 See Estate of V.C. Andrews, 850 F. Supp. at 1281 (giving Andrews’s date of death as 
December 19, 1986); David Streitfeld, A Novelist’s Tales from the Crypt: V.C. Andrews 
Died in 1986 but Her Horror Books Keep Coming, WASH. POST, May 7, 1993, at A1 
(concluding that Andrews has been “more prolific dead than alive”). 
  
1226 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1171 
 
 
authorship of V.C. Andrews.270  Her agent independently arrived at the same 
idea.  The estate also agreed that the death of the author shouldn’t be an 
impediment to the life of profits.271  Andrew Neiderman, an English teacher in 
New York, was recruited to be the undisclosed ghostwriter.272 Neiderman 
received $250,000 of the original $1.5 million advance, while the rest went to 
the estate.273  While this was obviously not a significant portion of the literary 
proceeds, $250,000 was several times greater than any previous advance 
Neiderman had received for his own works of horror fiction published under 
his own name.274  Luckily for everyone (except, perhaps, V.C. Andrews), the 
Neiderman books continued to sell.275  Subsequently, an IRS auditor learned of 
the immense profits that the Andrews estate was reaping from the continued 
exploitation of the V.C. Andrews name, and assessed the estate $649,201.77 in 
unpaid estate tax and interest on the $1,244,910.80 post-mortem value of the 
use of Andrews’s name in conjunction with the misattributed novels.276  This 
led to a courtroom battle and a judicial order slightly reducing the IRS 
assessment, in part due to the financial risks inherent in attempting to deceive 
the public into believing that a dead author was still writing books.277  Today, 
270 Jack Romanos, head of Simon & Schuster’s mass market division, conceived the idea.  
He explains that after Andrews’s death, “[w]e were sitting around and it occurred to me that 
it was possible if we could find a writer . . . who could mimic Virginia’s style, that we might 
be able to continue to publish.”  Streitfeld, supra note 269, at A1.  Andrews’s literary agent 
had the same idea: “she never was a celebrity in this country, which made it easier for 
people to forget she was dead.  It would be very difficult to do this with Danielle Steele.”  
Id. 
271 See id. (noting that the estate has “profited handsomely” from the posthumous books). 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. (stating that Neiderman “had written some horror novels himself, although much 
less successfully than Andrews”). 
275 But this doesn’t mean that the customers are happy.  Many volunteer reviewers on 
Amazon.com – even those who give Midnight Flight positive ratings – implore either the 
ghost-writer or the family to stop using the V.C. Andrew’s name.  For instance, “Stephanie” 
from Washington, D.C. liked the book, but writes:  
why can’t he stop putting VCA as the author?  It would make more sense now as I have 
more [ghostwritten] books on my shelf than [Andrews’s books] because she wrote so 
few on her own.  Use your own name[, ghostwriter].  It will be okay, and maybe better 
cause we can stop holding you up to VCA (The Queen). 
The interestingly named “Gertrude Snuffenheimer” from Atlanta, on the other hand, writes: 
“[t]his is shameful.  Poor V.C., rolling around in her grave as I write this.  Why does the 
[ghostwriter] insist on driving her good name through the mud?  I never even finished 
Broken Wings, and this one just tops off the true V.C. genius abuse.”  See Amazon.com 
Reviews of Midnight Flight, http://www.amazon.com (search “Midnight Flight,” follow 
“Midnight Flight” link, then follow “See all customer reviews” link) (last visited Aug. 12, 
2005). 
276 Estate of V.C. Andrews v. United States,  850 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
277 Id. at 1295 (reducing the tax assessment of the value of Andrews’s name by thirty-
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even after a Washington Post newspaper article, the misattribution of V.C. 
Andrews novels continues.278 
Given the public’s awareness of the ghostwriting in the cases of Clancy and 
Andrews, and the apparent nonchalance and lack of embarrassment of the 
parties engaged in the practice, one may well wonder how deep the rabbit-hole 
of ghostwriting goes in the publishing industry.  Because the uses of Tom 
Clancy’s and V.C. Andrews’s names in the sale of books comport fairly well 
with theories of rights of publicity and even standard approaches to 
trademarks, there seems little reason to suspect that there are substantial checks 
being placed on ghostwriting practices. 
But if we take a social perspective on the value of authorial attributions, 
none of this should sit well.  Authorial “licensing” is made valuable by a form 
of consumer deception that is inimical to the traditional consumer protection 
rationale of trademark.279  Misattribution of authorial identity is valuable to 
those who engage in it precisely because it deceives the public.280  Even from 
the perspective of an incentives theory, it isn’t at all clear that ghostwriting 
provides any public benefits.  Has the sale of books by Clancy™ (Rovin) or 
V.C. Andrews™ (Neiderman) been beneficial to the public?  It seems clear 
that traditional trademark law does not map neatly onto authorship in some 
instances.  In order to protect the public interest, one would need to be much 
more restrictive in granting personal name “owners” the freedom to “license” 
their authorial attributions.  This aligns with Professor McCarthy’s observation 
that the law must “insur[e] that the assignee’s use of the mark will not be 
deceptive, and will not break the continuity of the thing symbolized by the 
three percent to account for the risk involved). 
278 At some point, a tiny disclaimer was added to the copyright page of the book stating 
that Andrews is dead.  V.C. ANDREWS, MIDNIGHT FLIGHT (2003).  However, as in the Clancy 
example, this gesture at informational veracity is small, ambiguous, and hard to reconcile 
with the bold authorial attribution on the covers of the books, which everyone seems to 
admit is what drives the sale of the books.  The Simon & Schuster web page for V.C. 
Andrews seems to fully recognize that readers are interested in the identity of the author.  It 
contains many photos of Andrews, a brief biography of her early life, and a list of her 
current paperbacks for sale.  However, it has no pictures of Andrew Neiderman; it fails to 
distinguish between the Neiderman and Andrews books; and it does not mention that V.C. 
Andrews died some years ago.  See Simon Says: V.C. Andrews, 
http://www.simonsays.com/content/content.cfm?sid=33&pid=330975 (last viewed Aug. 12, 
2005) (follow “Image Gallery” link). 
279 For some thoughts along these lines, see Green, supra note 25, at 190 (“[T]he 
author’s consent should not be a defense to plagiarism.”); Pinover, supra note 40, at 41 
(observing that ghostwriting, which is essentially authorized reversed passing off, “does not 
cure the deception of the consuming public”). 
280 See Estate of V.C. Andrews, 850 F. Supp. at 1284-85 (explaining that measures were 
taken to “maintain the illusion” that the ghostwritten books were Andrews’ work, because 
“Andrews’ name was central to the promotional effort”). 
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assigned mark.”281  If authorial attribution interests are to be protected under 
trademark-type theories, they must be protected in a way that is unlike 
traditional trademark protections.  Attribution must be bounded to some factual 
and socially valuable truth about the identity of the true author.  In other 
words, in the case of authorial attribution, trademark law should ensure the 
reliability of consumer beliefs about the connection between claims of 
authorship and the true process of the work’s creation.  Consumer beliefs can 
vary according to the type of work at issue, as will be discussed in the next 
section. 
B. Collaborative Authorship and Social Value 
In ghostwriting, where the attributed author writes nothing and the existence 
of the ghostwriter is undisclosed, we clearly are faced with certain problems as 
set forth above. However, in some instances of ghostwriting, an attributed 
author will make some contribution to a literary production.  Also, a 
ghostwriter occasionally obtains some acknowledgement for contributions.  
Collaborations between celebrities and skilled authors are sometimes truthfully 
marketed as such.  Thus, the situation of ghostwriting simply marks one 
extreme position within a much broader spectrum of comparative attribution 
issues in cases where collaborators produce creative works.  In instances of 
collaboration, the same dynamics that fuel ghostwriting will often lead to 
marketing strategies that promote to the public the reputation of the prominent 
author – even where the parties contribute equally.  An example might be 
taken from the recent literary output of the Supreme Court.  In the year before 
the decision in Dastar, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor published a book about 
her early childhood: Lazy B: Growing Up on a Cattle Ranch in the American 
Southwest.282  She collaborated on the book with H. Alan Day, her brother.  
Day is a lifelong cattle rancher (and writer) who ran the Lazy B ranch for thirty 
years.283  According to USA Today, Day provided O’Connor with the 
“material” for the book, which O’Connor then revised and reorganized.284 
Just as Doubleday knew that Eisenhower’s authorship could sell copies of 
281 3 MCCARTHY § 18:2, supra note 100, at 18-8 to 18-9; Fair Undercar Care, Inc. v. 
Wakefield, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10120, at *16 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 1992) (citing 
MCCARTHY). 
282 SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A CATTLE RANCH IN 
THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (hardcover ed., Random House 2002). 
283 Deirdre Donahue, Even Cowgirls Get to the High Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2002, 
at 1D (reporting that Day “remained on the ranch, managing it for 30 years after graduating 
from the University of Arizona”). 
284 According to USA Today, “[b]oth siblings agree that Day possesses more 
‘institutional memories.’  He would write material for the book, then his sister would revise 
and reorganize his original drafts.  They also would meet, correspond and compare their 
memories.  O’Connor eliminated Day’s chapter, ‘My Sister Sandra.’” Donahue, supra note 
283. 
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Crusade in Europe, publisher Random House surely knew that Justice 
O’Connor’s authorship could sell copies of Lazy B.  Indeed, just as Crusade in 
Europe was marketed as being Eisenhower writing about his memories of 
World War II, Lazy B was marketed as Justice O’Connor writing about her 
memories of childhood.  O’Connor’s authorial designation appears on the 
cover at roughly twice the size of her brother’s (four times as large on the 
paperback), O’Connor’s picture appears on the cover,285 O’Connor reads aloud 
the audiobook version, and – perhaps most importantly – the book is written 
using the first person voice of Justice O’Connor.286  Even chapters that deal 
primarily with Alan Day and his private thoughts are also written in the voice 
of O’Connor.287  Given the collaborative nature of the book’s production and 
its topic, there was obviously some inherent potential for consumer confusion 
as to the authorship of Lazy B.  Some readers undoubtedly bought the book to 
gain a glimpse into the thinking of one of the most influential Supreme Court 
Justices of the last century.  Instead, they found a great many details about 
cattle ranching.  This is not to say that there was anything misleading about the 
book.  But it does point out how the marketing of collaborative authorship is 
influenced by the gravitational pull of one author’s celebrity.  The mechanics 
of production may be influenced by other factors.  Even where collaboration is 
fully disclosed, when consumers misestimate the type and degree of 
collaboration that can be expected, they may be disappointed.288 
Yet many, perhaps most, entertainment products for sale today are produced 
by similar processes of collaborative authorship.289  In the case of film, for 
285 O’CONNOR & DAY, supra note 282; SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & ALAN DAY, LAZY B: 
GROWING UP ON A CATTLE RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (paperback ed., Random 
House 2003). 
286 See O’CONNOR & DAY, supra note 282, at 6 (narrating in the first person). 
287 Id. at 213-225.  For example, Chapter 20 is primarily about Day and his horse, Saber, 
and seems a strange fit with the first person voice of Justice O’Connor.  The use of 
O’Connor’s point of view requires Day’s thoughts to be rendered in the third person.  See, 
e.g., id. at 224:  
Alan picked up a big half-Brahma cow that looked pretty athletic and decided to turn 
Saber loose on her.  Alan had always held him back a little and had never really let him 
loose on a cow to run her and turn her back because he was so powerful and so fast.  
Alan always wanted to throttle him back a little.  This time, just for fun, Alan turned 
the old cow up the fence. . . .  He let the reins go slack and thought, “Well, let’s see 
what happens here.”   
The excised “My Sister Sandra” chapter obviously would have been even more difficult to 
reconcile with O’Connor’s first person voice.  See supra note 284. 
288 There has been an interesting recent trend, in a similar family vein, of collaborations 
among parental authors and their children.  In some cases, the children continue to write in 
the same literary genre of the parent.  The family name “brand” of the parent is recognized 
by the public, the intellectual property licenses are probably not so hard to negotiate, and 
some degree of familiarity with the material might be reasonably presumed on the part of 
the child.  Of course, one wonders if authorial expertise and talent are hereditary. 
289 See Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 26, at 979 (observing that many creative works 
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instance, there are often hundreds of authors.  The film Saving Private Ryan 
was marketed as a “Steven Spielberg film,” yet it involved the creative 
contributions of over 700 individuals.290 The list of authors whose 
contributions created stylistic “fingerprints” on Saving Private Ryan is 
obviously extremely long.  It is so long that it would clearly be beyond the 
interest, as well as beyond the ability, of the average consumer to remember 
the names of these individuals and to understand what each individual 
contributed to the film.  It is unlikely that director Steven Spielberg knows who 
deserves personal credit for each aspect of the film.  The Dastar Court was 
correct to recognize that consumers may not be interested in all information 
regarding authorship of collaborative creations.291 
So how does this modify the conclusions in the previous section?  
Obviously, in cases involving more than two or three authors who contribute to 
a single work, consumer interests in ascertaining the details of a work’s 
authorship can become much more diffused.292  In the case of written works, if 
the public purchases a book it believes to be authored by Tom Clancy or V.C. 
Andrews, we can say that the public has been deceived if Tom Clancy or V.C. 
Andrews did not, in fact, make a substantial authorial contribution to the 
authorship of the purchased book.  If the public purchases a “Steven Spielberg” 
movie, however, the public will not be deceived if it finds out that Spielberg 
did not personally write the script, create the costumes, compose the music, 
and act all the parts.293  The public is aware that Spielberg instead supervised, 
partially controlled and had some auteur influence over various aspects of the 
movie. 
Steven Spielberg’s directorial role in Saving Private Ryan is clearly relevant 
to consumers.  The fact that Spielberg could manage to get his name put on the 
film seems to validate the point that his authorial attribution provides some 
are now produced by committee). 
290 See Saving Private Ryan: Full Cast and Crew, The Internet Movie Database, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120815/fullcredits (last visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
291 An unidentified Justice stated during oral argument in the Dastar case that film 
credits are generally something that “no one ever reads.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 
51, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428) (“I 
mean, the screen credits, you know, you’re going to the refrigerator or reading cert petitions 
or something.”); cf. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35-36 (“We do not think the Lanham Act requires 
this search for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.”). 
292 This isn’t to say that crediting in instances of large-scale collaboration is not of 
interest to some segment of the public.  Within creative industries, credits can be extremely 
important.  Indeed, it was the presumed importance of film credits to actors and the film 
industry that led the Ninth Circuit to adopt the “bodily appropriation” doctrine.  See Cleary 
v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994). 
293 Nor does copyright law grant much weight to screen credits.  See Dougherty, supra 
note 217, at 313 (“A person is not an author under U.S. law simply because he is called the 
director or is credited as the director on screen.  The fundamental question under U.S. law 
is: Who originated a particular expression?”). 
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value.  Again, Post-it™ Notes could be, but aren’t, distributed with similar 
attributions.294  Primary marketing attribution is often used as an additional 
form of incentive and compensation.  Key parties in the film process will often 
wrangle and even litigate over their right to be promoted as the creative force 
behind a project.295  The end result of this process (which is additionally 
regulated in minute detail by the various guilds and collective bargaining 
agreements) is a particular presentation and marketing of a film’s “authorship” 
to the public.  This marketing usually promotes a very small subset of actual 
authors – perhaps a director, a lead actor, and/or another significant 
contributor, such as the author of a book that is being adapted.296  In the case of 
Saving Private Ryan, Steven Spielberg, Tom Hanks, and Matt Damon were the 
primary brands under which the film was marketed.297 
For the public, this kind of personal “branding” of collaborative efforts, 
while it may not explain much about the details of the complicated process of 
authorship, can still provide important information in much the same way that 
a traditional trademark provides some useful information.  As stated above, the 
word “Nike” on a sneaker generally means very little to a consumer in terms of 
actual information.  Likewise, the fact that a certain person has been associated 
with a certain project may say very little about any personal involvement with 
the work’s creation.  But if that person has previously appeared in association 
with high quality creative works, this can be taken by the public as some 
indication that the new film’s quality and characteristics will be the same as 
those previously associated with that actor or director.298  Society certainly 
294 Similarly, the end credits of a motion picture, even the most obscure ones, are not 
simply superfluous nonsense.  They are surely relevant as a personal motivator to those 
engaged in film production, and may also be useful within the movie industry.  Those 
professionals who understand the making of films may have an interest in knowing the 
identities of individuals behind creative contributions, and credits can help individuals 
secure work on later projects.  MELVIN SIMENSKY ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 1005-1120 
(3d ed. 2003).  This is not to suggest, however, that these long lists of film credits provide 
much of value to the average consumer. 
295 See generally Gulick, supra note 113 (discussing attribution practices and 
negotiations in film crediting); see also SIMENSKY ET AL., supra note 294, at 1005-20 
(discussing contractual disputes over credit obligations);  Gulick, supra note 113 at 87 (“For 
directors such as Warren Beatty and Woody Allen, the granting of the [final cut] right is in 
the interests of the producers, who view it as a simple exchange for access to the proven 
economic success of the director’s name and reputation.”). 
296 One can get a sense of how marketing concerns, financial power, and artistic ego 
collide by looking at any group of movie posters and comparing the size and placement of 
the names of actors, producers, directors, and (in some cases) the novelists, playwrights, or 
other persons that provided the inspiration for the film. 
297 And, in turn, the film’s success further promoted the strength of these brands. 
298 Gulick, supra note 113, at 100:  
When a consumer thinks of the author of a film, he thinks of its artistic, not legal, 
author. . . .  For consumers, the attribution of a film’s source to its director functions 
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recognizes the brand value of the participation of Julia Roberts or George 
Clooney with a film project.  The public knows that these names and 
reputations are placed on the line by association with the project – if the 
project fails, the branded celebrity will suffer a loss of public reputation.  Thus, 
practices of authorial attribution where certain personalities reap credit for the 
efforts of large collaborative teams operate in much the same way that 
trademark identifiers establish consumer associations with the collaborative 
production of business, corporate, and contractually licensed entities.299  In the 
case of large-scale collaboration, the basis for trademark protection becomes 
much more analogous to the traditional reputation and endorsement 
dynamics.300 
However, the difference between authorship and trademark in the case of 
collaborative enterprises also suggests that a deviation from normal trademark 
doctrine is warranted.  Claims of reverse passing off are hard to justify where 
the choice of any particular personal association with a work of collective 
authorship is largely arbitrary.  Because traditional trademarks designate 
collective enterprises, reverse passing off arguably promotes greater truth in 
communication in an economical fashion.  In the case of large-scale projects, 
such as films, none of the myriad of authors clearly deserves to be one of the 
subset of persons who have their authorial identities explicitly advertised and 
promoted in association with the work.  It would seem impossible to allow, for 
instance, each of several hundred contributors to a film to claim that a work 
was being “passed off” where they were not attributed with authorship in 
conjunction with the sale of the work.  Additionally, as the Dastar court noted, 
the corporate publisher (the copyright “author”) of a film and the manufacturer 
of the film’s tangible medium are largely irrelevant to consumers – thus 
reverse passing off, as applied to those entities, will serve no socially useful 
purpose.301  In the case of collaborative authorship, it seems the justification 
for the doctrine of reverse passing off falls away.  The Dastar case reaches the 
right results, but for the wrong reasons. 
The difference between collaborative and individual authorship with regard 
to reverse passing off is significant.  The attribution of authorship, or the 
like a brand-name identifier. . . .  There is a certain value to consumers to the extent 
that they form these associations, for they save on search and information costs. 
299 See Hughes, supra note 18 (discussing how common trademarks such as Sara Lee 
represent collaborations between several corporate entities). 
300 Indeed, some popular “authors” are artificial constructs.  For instance, bands like 
Alvin and the Chipmunks and the contemporary band Gorillaz feature animated cartoons as 
musicians, essentially attributing musical talent to fictional authors that are collaboratively 
produced.  See Gorillaz, http://www.gorillaz.com/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2005) (official 
website).  For a high-tech take on the animated celebrity, see the recent film Simone (New 
Line Cinema 2002). 
301 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003) (“The 
purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity of the producer of the 
physical tome . . . .”). 
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failure to attribute authorship, in the case of a singular author (or a small set of 
authors) carries with it some degree of socially important empirical truth.  
Thus, ghostwriting should be actionable as a form of reverse passing off.  By 
contrast, large-scale collaborative efforts disassociate the authorship mark from 
any factually meaningful information about the product. 
C. The Limits of Attribution Protection 
Finally, I would like to suggest that any application of trademark law to 
works of authorship must be limited to marks that meet three criteria: 1) they 
should be prominently placed (or deserve to be placed) on the exterior of the 
work; 2) they should be placed (or deserve to be placed) there with the hope of 
establishing goodwill and driving sales of the product; and 3) they should serve 
to designate creative authorship to readers who would care about this 
authorship.  None of these requirements is particularly unusual under 
traditional notions of trademark law.  Trademark law has traditionally focused 
on extrinsic marks placed on the exteriors of products,302 and has sought to 
protect consumers against confusion as to the source of products where such 
confusion will lead to ill-informed purchases.303 
Yet in the current climate of trademark regulation, authorship protections 
could clearly extend beyond this point.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit case of Smith 
v. Montoro,304 relied upon by the lower courts in the Dastar case and overruled 
by Dastar, was essentially an attempt to regulate the crediting of component 
parts of a work under a theory of trademark.305  Smith, and courts that relied 
upon it, suggested that credit sequences of films were an appropriate concern 
of trademark law.306  If one approaches trademark regulation from the 
standpoint of anti-plagiarism norms, moral rights arguments, or analogies to 
rights of publicity, one might argue that the result in Smith v. Montoro is 
justified.  The criteria above, however, would not extend so far.  I would 
suggest that if we regulate authorship designations pursuant to trademark law, 
we should do it in a way that comports with a very conservative approach to 
the goals of trademark regulation. 
I make this qualification somewhat reluctantly.  There are arguments to be 
made for broader protections.  Consumer deception can certainly occur with 
regard to the authorship of component pieces of creative work.  Our social 
norms against plagiarism do not just condemn the misattribution of entire 
works of authorship where those misattributions are made on the exterior 
surfaces of works sold in commerce.  Instead, anti-plagiarism norms extend to 
302 Rogers, supra note 73 (characterizing the origins of trademark law in the regulation of 
guild emblems on goods). 
303 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (describing the purpose of trademark law). 
304 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). 
305 Id. at 605 (finding that trademark law properly applied to the substitution of one 
actor’s name for another in a film’s credits and advertising). 
306 See id. 
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condemn much more fine-grained instances of misattribution, where authors 
borrow phrases or ideas without attribution.  Plagiarism concerns itself with 
appropriate credit for the multiple bits and pieces of a work.307  However, none 
of the recent plagiarism scandals mentioned in the introduction would run 
afoul of my proposed standard.  Why not extend the standard further?  To 
extend regulation of attribution as finely as plagiarism would reach would 
likely prove overly burdensome for authors, readers, and the court system.  The 
burden of writing, reading, and regulating extensive footnotes and credit lists 
for every creative text sold to the public is not an obligation one would want to 
impose on the entertainment business or the purchasing public.  Creativity 
itself is often merely a practice of finding bits and pieces of the works of others 
and assembling them into a new unified whole.308  Because all words and 
symbols must refer to prior words and symbols simply in order to be 
intelligible, all new works must borrow from prior works to some degree.309  
To insert law into this process by regulating authorial attribution for the bits 
and pieces of authorship contained inside texts would almost certainly lead to 
the disclosure of more information than any consumer would care to know. 
1. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Crediting: Vocal Dubbing 
To show the effect of a conservative approach in practice, we might take, for 
example, the practice of vocal dubbing.  In vocal dubbing, one person’s voice 
is directly blended with the image of another person’s vocalizing.  One can see 
that vocal dubbing might easily raise concerns very similar to those raised by 
ghostwriting.  If Tom Clancy, for instance, is credited (and shown on music 
videos) as the vocalist on an album of great Broadway show tunes, some of his 
admiring public may be inclined to purchase the album.  If Jeff Rovin were 
actually singing the songs, however, this would be a deceptive designation of 
authorship.310 Where the item for sale is a musical work, and the authorship of 
the vocal performance is clearly a primary concern of the purchaser, this type 
307 See generally PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A 
POSTMODERN WORLD (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999); Malcolm Gladwell, 
Something Borrowed, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 22, 2004, at 40 (describing how a 
psychiatrist tracked “thematic similarities” between her book and a play she alleged was 
plagiarized from it). 
308 There are many other words for this process, e.g., collage, collection, arrangement, 
found art, etc.  For some thoughts on the importance of this process to art and its limits, see 
generally Gladwell, supra note 307 (discussing the work of playwright Bryony Lavery and 
her use of sources in the Broadway play Frozen). 
309 See, e.g., Note, Originality, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1990 (2002) (asserting that “all 
writing is, in some sense, rewriting”). 
310 Ventriloquism and puppetry are essentially ancient technologies of dubbing.  These 
uses do not strike most adults as deceptive, however, because they must take place within 
the realm of suspended disbelief.  (We all know puppets can’t talk.)  Animation today is 
another popular and unproblematic use of dubbing. 
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of deception should be actionable under trademark law.  My proposed line, 
however, would separate this hypothetical situation from more common 
instances of vocal dubbing.  Vocal dubbing in a film, for instance, would likely 
not be actionable.  As stated above, the consumer concerns over particular 
component pieces of authorship within a work are more diffuse. 
Is there a public interest in preventing vocal dubbing in collaborative 
efforts?  Consider the classic Hollywood film Singin’ in the Rain.311 The film 
is set during the revolutionary point in film history when the industry was 
being transformed from the era of silent film to the era of contemporary 
“talkies.”  In the movie, Gene Kelly plays the part of Don Lockwood, a former 
vaudevillian and stuntman turned celebrity actor.312  When a major film project 
fails due to his co-star’s poor vocal talents, Lockwood proposes that his love 
interest, the aspiring actress Kathy Selden (played by Debbie Reynolds) should 
provide the on-screen singing voice of the acoustically challenged Lina 
Lamont (played by Jean Hagen).  Both Lockwood and Selden are aware that 
this practice will mislead the public as to Lamont’s singing talents, and also 
won’t do much to promote Selden’s career.  Yet Selden agrees to the 
arrangement in order to save Lockwood’s career from ruin.  What seems a 
perfect idea at first leads to predictable comedic complications: Lamont 
demands that Selden be required to dub her singing vocals permanently and 
threatens the head of the studio if he does not comply with her demands.313  At 
the film’s premiere, Lockwood and the owner of the film studio create a ruse to 
reveal the dubbing.  They demand that Selden must sing for Lamont, live, 
behind a curtain while Lamont lip-synchs.  Selden grows indignant, but 
complies.  In the film’s climax, Lockwood and the studio head literally raise 
the curtain on the undisclosed Selden/Lamont collaboration. This public 
disclosure of Selden’s vocal dubbing for Lamont both humiliates Lamont and 
catapults Selden into Hollywood stardom.314 
The moral of the film seems clear – Lamont’s claiming credit for the work 
of Selden was deceptive.  The film suggests that the public will hold the 
Lamonts of the world in contempt and will support the Seldens, the true and 
311 SINGIN’ IN THE RAIN (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1952).  Perhaps the film is such a classic 
in Hollywood because it is all about Hollywood.  It provides parodies of real personalities in 
the movie industry – language coaches, egomaniacal studio heads, aspiring starlets who 
profess to be concerned about high art, and venomous divas threatening to bankrupt studios. 
312 See Singin’ in the Rain: Full Cast and Crew, The Internet Movie Database, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0045152/fullcredits (last visited Aug. 12, 2005). 
313 Lamont explicitly evokes her legal and contractual rights:  
I had my lawyer go over my contract. . . .  The studio’s responsible for every word printed 
about me.  If I don’t like it, I can sue, I can sue.  If you tell the papers about Kathy 
Selden, it would be detrimental and deleterious to my career.  I could sue you for the 
whole studio.  
SINGIN’ IN THE RAIN (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1952). 
314 Id. 
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talented vocal authors.  During the late 1980s, the pop music duo Milli Vanilli 
found themselves re-enacting this morality play.  Charles Shaw, John Davis, 
and Brad Howe played the part of Selden.315  The trio had vocal talent, but they 
were getting older and had been deemed (by their manager) unmarketable to 
the MTV generation.  So their manager hired aspiring dancer/models Rob 
Pilatus and Fabrice Morvan to be Lamonts, lip-synching the trio’s songs.  The 
arrangement worked fantastically – everyone thought Pilatus and Morvan were 
actually singing the songs.  In 1990, Milli Vanilli won a coveted Grammy 
Award for Best New Artist (beating out the Indigo Girls and rapper Tone-
Loc).316  Pilatus and Morvan were overnight celebrities.  They pressed their 
manager to let them sing on their next album.  The band’s manager, apparently 
overwhelmed by orchestrating the deception and dealing with competing 
demands (much like the studio owner in Singin’ in the Rain), raised the curtain 
on the lip-synching.317  The public was appropriately shocked, the Grammy 
Award was revoked, and the band became a scapegoat for all that was 
inauthentic about popular music.318  And yes, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of a 
wronged public.319  Like Lamont before them, Pilatus and Morvan were 
disgraced.320  (Unfortunately, the public of the MTV era did not catapult Shaw, 
315 Wikipedia: Milli Vanilli, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milli_Vanilli (last visited Aug. 
12, 2005). 
316 Id. (describing Milli Vanilli as the only group ever to have a Grammy Award 
revoked). 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 A lawsuit was initiated based upon the claim that the public had been fraudulently 
deceived into purchasing Milli Vanilli albums by the misrepresentation that Morvan and 
Pilatus actually sang the vocals.  See Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 225 
(E.D. Pa. 1991); Cross, supra note 20, at 709 & n.1. 
320 Of course, Milli Vanilli was not the first band to be accused of inauthenticity.  The 
1960’s pop band The Monkees, for instance, is commonly criticized for being deceptively 
inauthentic.  The group was the brainchild of two entertainment executives, Bob Rafelson 
and Bert Schneider, who created the band as a way to use television to cash in on the 
Beatles phenomenon.  They recruited the band members (two actors and two musicians) 
from auditions involving hundreds of aspirants.  Stephen Stills of Crosby Stills & Nash 
actually auditioned.  A separate creative team wrote the Monkees’ early songs and studio 
musicians were employed to play the musical instruments on the song tracks.  At one point, 
it was even planned that the Monkees would simply lipsynch all their songs exactly as Milli 
Vanilli did, so that the band members would contribute nothing but their images and acting.  
Ultimately, however, some members of the band were allowed to add vocal tracks to the 
songs.  While the band members were originally hired for $450 a week and less than 2 
percent of the record royalties, they followed the normal path of leveraging their acquired 
fame to push for greater creative control.  Those efforts were partially successful – records 
and singles by the Monkees at times topped sales of the Beatles – but greater creative control 
also heralded the band’s decline.  The group’s chemistry, its public image, and its fame were 
largely attributable to the success of the syndicated television show and the “authorship” of 
the two creative managers.  The individual members had to struggle – largely unsuccessfully 
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Davis, and Howe to stardom.)  After a long downward career spiral – including 
a stint in prison – Rob Pilatus died of a drug overdose in Germany in 1998.321 
The moral conclusions of both Singin’ in the Rain and the Milli Vanilli affair 
might seem congruent.  However, looking past the fiction of Singin’ in the 
Rain, the making of the movie tells a completely different story.  Kathy Selden 
actually had her own Kathy Seldens: Betty Noyes sang many of Debbie 
Reynolds’s songs in the film and Gene Kelly actually dubbed some of 
Reynolds’s tap dancing.322  In the most interesting reversal – Jean Hagan (who 
played Lamont) dubbed Reynolds’s speech in the scenes where Selden was 
dubbing the voice of Lamont.323  Even in 1952, in a film marketed to the public 
as a story about the triumph of artistic authenticity, the makers of the film had 
very little interest in authenticity.324  Hollywood filmmakers still dub vocal 
performances just as readily as they use stunt and body doubles to attribute 
greater prowess and beauty to the celebrities.325  Marni Nixon is probably the 
most famous Kathy Selden figure in Hollywood.326  She dubbed Deborah Kerr 
in the film version of The King and I, sang for Natalie Wood in West Side 
Story, and was Audrey Hepburn’s voice in My Fair Lady.327  Of course, few 
people know of her existence, and some undoubtedly think that Kerr, Wood, 
and Hepburn have remarkable singing voices. 
My proposal would make the Milli Vanilli facts amenable to legal 
regulation, since the attributions of authorship to Pilatus and Morvan were 
used to promote and sell the work and were factually deceptive as to 
authorship.328  The misattributions that are inherent in the public’s reading of 
– to become something like the musical group that they played on television.  For extended 
versions of this story, see ERIC LEFCOWITZ, THE MONKEES’ TALE (2d ed. 1989); MICKEY 
DOLENZ & MARK BEGO, I’M A BELIEVER: MY LIFE OF MONKEES, MUSIC, AND MADNESS 
(2004).  If you actually want to follow up on this footnote, I would recommend the 
Lefcowitz book.  It’s much easier to read. 
321 See VH1: Milli Vanilli, http://www.vh1.com/artists/az/milli_vanilli/bio.jhtml (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2005). 
322 Steven Cohan, Case Study: Interpreting Singin’ in the Rain, in REINVENTING FILM 
STUDIES 59 (Christine Gledhill & Linda Williams eds., 2000). 
323 Id. 
324 Perhaps this is why Hollywood loves Singin’ in the Rain so much – there’s plenty of 
irony if you know the inside story. 
325 In the film, Don Lockwood breaks into the film industry by performing as another 
actor’s stunt double. 
326 DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, LE TON BEAU DE MAROT: IN PRAISE OF THE MUSIC OF 
LANGUAGE 62 (1998) (recounting Nixon’s career as a “ghost” singer for several famous 
actresses). 
327 Id.; see also Wikipedia: Marni Nixon, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marni_Nixon (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2005). 
328 An interesting twist on the Milli Vanilli affair occurred recently.  A 1980s-era band of 
aging punk rockers, The Alarm, drafted members of a much younger band to appear on 
screen, while the music of The Alarm was dubbed on top of the visuals.  Apparently, this 
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Singin’ in the Rain, however, should not be actionable because they are not 
made extrinsic to the work.  Obviously, this is somewhat problematic.  The 
dubbing in Singin’ in the Rain creates the potential for public deception with 
regard to the singing talents of actors.  The visually presented actor who is 
dubbed (i.e., Debbie Reynolds) almost certainly garnered a public reputational 
value that should have been properly attributed to an undisclosed collaborator 
(i.e., Betty Noyes).  And just as in ghostwriting, this worked well from a 
marketing perspective – both Noyes and Reynolds benefited. 
But the vocal dubbing deception in Singin’ in the Rain isn’t linked to the 
sale of the work or severable from the work.  Perhaps more importantly, there 
would have been no way to correct the deception within the context of 
collaboratively produced work without disrupting the integrity of the movie.  It 
would also seem unwise, and perhaps impossible, to attempt to “fix” the public 
confusion as to authorship in Singin’ in the Rain without destroying the film 
or, in any event, providing the public with far more information than it would 
want or need in order to make purchasing decisions.  And if we “fix” the 
misattribution in Singin’ in the Rain, why stop there?  We could require 
disclaimers for all potentially deceptive practices in film, e.g., special effects, 
body doubles, stuntmen, and digital editing.  But accepting that the 
entertainment industry is premised on the creation and sale of illusions, there 
are sound reasons to be conservative in attempting to root out instances of 
consumer deception. 
2. The Inherent Deceptions of Art 
This last point – that the marketing of illusion is inherently deceptive – is 
worth a few additional comments.  The goal of trademark law, in a very broad 
sense, is to promote truth in market communications.  Yet art, as Picasso noted, 
is a lie.329  Obviously there is some potential here for conflict.  To illustrate the 
kind of misattribution that is inherent in the artistic form, we might look to 
Edmond Rostand’s Cyrano de Bergerac.  The play is essentially a story of 
authorial misattribution.330  The interesting tension latent in the play is that the 
approach worked and the song gained a considerable amount of airplay.  The band then 
raised the curtain on itself and explained that it had engaged in the duplicity because: “We 
wanted to make sure we are judged purely on the strength of the music, and not by our old 
hairstyles.”  See BBC Wales: The Alarm, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/wales/music/profiles/pages/alarm.shtml (last visited Aug. 12, 2005) 
(describing The Alarm as one of the most internationally successful rock bands to come out 
of Wales). 
329 A lie that tells the truth, but a lie nonetheless. 
330 EDMOND ROSTAND, CYRANO DE BERGERAC (Brian Hooker trans., Bantam Classics 
1950).  In brief summary, Cyrano, who has a rather large and aesthetically unappealing 
proboscis, writes words for another suitor, Christian, to deliver to the lovely Roxane, who is 
also the object of Cyrano’s affections.  At the end of the play, after the passage of many 
years, the misattribution of Cyrano’s words to Christian’s authorship is revealed, and 
Roxane declares her love for Cyrano, the author.  Cyrano dies of injuries moments later. 
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artifice of authorial misattribution that is condemned in the play is, in fact, 
integral to the dramatic form of the play itself.  When watching the play, we 
suspend our disbelief in the identity of the actor and attribute the words of 
Rostand to the authority of the actor who plays Cyrano.  Within and without 
the context of the performance, we are told that authorial misattribution runs 
the risk of fraud.  Yet within the play, misattribution is inherent in the 
collaboration between playwright and actor in creating the fictional world. 
Given our tendency to confuse the image with reality and the dancer with 
the dance, policing the line between fraud and entertainment can become 
problematic.  Can we cleanly separate our beliefs about popular actors, for 
instance, from the roles that they play?  When we see films, we suspend our 
disbelief of not only the spontaneity of the actor’s performance, but also of the 
entire artifice of the play’s constructed world.  To some extent, after the film is 
over, we can mentally sever the identity of the actor from the special effects, 
the effects of editing, the contribution of collaborators, and all the other 
material we see on the screen.  To some extent, though, we cannot.  Arnold 
Schwarzenegger’s recent success in the California gubernatorial election 
suggests the extent to which Hollywood can construct identity.  
Schwarzenegger’s popular appeal was surely based, in substantial part, on his 
association with stern, indestructible cyborgs, barbarians, and maverick action 
heroes.331 To some extent this was deceptive.  His performances were the 
result of scripted fictions, and scripted fictions are inherently deceptive in at 
least two ways.  First, the identity of the actor is merged with the identity of 
the fictional character.  Second, the performer often reaps credit for the work 
of numerous other collaborative players: writers, composers, choreographers, 
and other contributors who are not obvious to those viewing the performance. 
However, there are limits to what we can do with attempts to bring laws 
requiring truthful communication to the commercial enterprise of art.  I would 
suggest that while the regulation of extrinsic authorial designations that are 
relevant to consumers will not generally intrude on art’s deceptive nature, 
attempts to move past that point would be going too far.  If we attempt to move 
beyond the truth of extrinsic designations and regulate the ways in which art 
intrinsically deceives and confuses the public, we run the risk of curtailing the 
illusions and deceptions that are inherent in art. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has suggested that there are good reasons to reverse the holding 
of Dastar through legislation and to reintroduce the role of trademark law into 
the regulation of designations of authorship, at least to some conservative 
extent.  When we do this, however, we are also making a decision about the 
331 See Actor Biography: Arnold Schwarzenegger, The Internet Movie Database, 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000216 (last visited Aug. 12, 2005). 
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type of authorship that society obtains from the intellectual property system.332  
The decision between trademark law and proprietary-based schemes is also a 
question of cultural aesthetics.  As noted before with regard to the lip-synching 
practice of Milli Vanilli, misattributive practices can lead to the creation of 
very marketable illusions.333  To the extent trademark law requires honesty in 
attribution, it may make those illusions less likely to occur.  Does our society 
profit from marketable illusions such as deathless and impossibly prolific 
authors, photogenic singers with angelic voices, and Hollywood-forged mythic 
political candidates?  If people are willing to buy this stuff, isn’t that how we 
should weigh social utility? 
Perhaps society would actually be better off if Jeff Rovin and Andrew 
Neiderman were forced to publish novels under their own names, if not all our 
singers were photogenic, and if our system of politics was not so dependent on 
speechwriters and the business of illusion.  Would the unknown authors Rovin 
and Neiderman be better off if trademark law cast a shadow on their respective 
enterprises?  Probably not, but for every penny spent on a book written by a 
Neiderman or a Rovin, there are surely many other authors who are attempting 
to capture the public attention, retracing the steps of the fictional Kathy Selden 
in Singin’ in the Rain, believing that there is some truth to the story of her 
success.  This competition among artists and authors for our limited attention is 
a zero-sum game.  The shelf space devoted to the latest V.C. Andrews™ 
(Neiderman) and Tom Clancy™ (Rovin) books in my library is shelf space that 
cannot be used by the lesser-known authors who actually write under their own 
names. 
The law can provide no complete panacea for the business practices and 
marketing concerns that misallocate authorship.  Even if trademark law can 
come to the rescue to some limited degree, the costs and mechanics of 
enforcement and the inherent difficulties in ascertaining the facts of authorship 
might mean that ghostwriting and other misattributive practices would 
continue largely unchecked.  But it is justifiable to cast misattributive practices 
under a legal shadow.  Trademark law should not countenance intentional and 
misleading public deception where it can serve as a remedy.  Nor should our 
intellectual property laws simply concentrate on the goal of production, 
pumping out greater and greater quantities of expressive material for people to 
“consume.”  We should take account of the greater interests of society and the 
goals of all of this productive activity. 
As was demonstrated with the example of Michelangelo in Part I, the artistic 
pursuit of quality, fueled by the desire to make a name for oneself and achieve 
personal goals, is sometimes at odds with the pursuit of quantity.334  
Trademark has a role to play in promoting quality by forcing each individual 
332 See supra Part III. 
333 See Wikipedia: Milli Vanilli, supra note 315. 
334 VASARI, supra note 33, at 472 (describing how Michelangelo destroyed many of his 
own works that did not meet his standards). 
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author to stand on his or her own two feet and by discouraging practices where 
one author claims undue credit for the authorship of others.  The goals of 
trademark align with social intuitions condemning plagiarism and popular 
conceptions of what intellectual property law is designed to do.335  By restoring 
the trademark function of authorship and prohibiting deceptive misattributions 
of authorship that result in consumer harms, we might embrace what appears to 
be an increasingly radical concept in intellectual property law.  Trademark and 
copyright are not simply laws intended to parcel out new private property 
rights – they are laws that should be designed to promote and protect the 
greater interests of society. 
 
335 See Anonymous, supra note 65 (illustrating the moral condemnation of plagiarism). 
